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ABSTRACT
The composition and functioning of corporate boards is at the core of the academic and policy debate
on optimal corporate governance. But does board composition matter for corporate decisions? In this
paper, we analyze the role of financial experts on boards. In a novel panel data set on board composition,
we find that financial experts significantly affect corporate decisions, though not necessarily in the
interest of shareholders. First, when commercial bankers join boards, external funding increases and
investment-cash flow sensitivity diminishes. But, the increased financing affects mostly firms with
good credit and poor investment opportunities. Second, investment bankers on the board are associated
with larger bond issues, but also worse acquisitions. Third, we find little evidence that financial expertise
matters for compensation policy or for experts without affiliation to a financial institution. The results
suggest a tradeoff between outside incentives (e.g. bank profits) and the incentive to maximize firm
value. Requiring financial expertise on boards, as mandated by regulatory proposals, may not benefit
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Much of the recent corporate-governance debate revolves around the composition of cor-
porate boards. The question is which types of directors can be expected to serve the inter-
ests of shareholders. Following the recent wave of accounting scandals, regulators have 
stressed the need for more financial experts on boards. The implicit assumption is that 
“an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial statements” 
will lead to better board oversight and serve the interest of shareholders.
1 
Financial experts, however, might affect firm policies beyond more accurate dis-
closure and better audit committee performance. Directors spend a significant portion of 
their time on advising rather than monitoring (Adams and Ferreira (2003)). This influ-
ence can be problematic if directors are affiliated with financial institutions and pursue 
the interests of those institutions rather than maximizing shareholder value. Affiliation 
has raised concerns in several areas of financial intermediation, such as analyst recom-
mendations and IPO allocations.
2 Nevertheless, recent regulatory efforts to increase fi-
nancial expertise on boards do not preclude such conflicts. As Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) en-
acts a very broad definition of financial expertise,
3 bankers remain a common type of fi-
nancial expert on corporate boards.
4  
In this paper, we ask whether directors with financial expertise influence corpo-
rate policies and whether affiliation hampers their advisory role. We analyze both internal 
investment (capital expenditure) and external investment (mergers and acquisitions), us-
ing a novel data set on the board composition of 282 companies over 14 years.  
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we study the impact of financial ex-
perts on internal investment and on the financing of investment with bank loans. We ex-
amine all financial experts, but focus on commercial bankers. One hypothesis is that, if 
                                                 
1 See Section 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act (definition of audit committee financial experts). Simi-
larly, all major stock exchanges have introduced listing requirements on director financial literacy. See also 
the governance survey by Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004), e.g. recommendation R-36. 
2 Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007); Reuter (2005). 
3 The original SOX proposal had a more restrictive definition of financial expert, which would have only 
included CPAs and people with direct accounting experience. The objection from the business community 
(e.g. “Blue Ribbon Commissions”), which led to the softening of the definition, was that the pool of experts 
is too small, especially if bankers were to be excluded. (See Tenorio, 2003; Stuart, 2005). In our sample, 
accountants make up only 0.5% of directors. CFOs make up 1%. 
4 According to CFO Magazine’s analysis (Stuart, 2005), roughly 30% of boards (among the Fortune 100) 
identified a director who is “an evaluator of financial statements, such as a banker or investor,” an execu-
tive who merely supervised the finance or accounting function, or a director with “no discernible profes-
sional experience in finance” as their financial expert for the purpose of compliance with SOX.   2  
firms are financially constrained due to information asymmetries (Myers and Majluf 
(1984); Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)), bankers enable firms to finance value-
creating projects they would otherwise forgo. In that case, bankers decrease the sensitiv-
ity of investment to the availability of internal funds.
5 An alternative hypothesis is that 
bankers provide loans even when it is not in the interest of shareholders. Lending to un-
constrained firms with low default risk – even if they have no value-creating projects – 
may increase bank profits. And it may enable empire-building or overconfident managers 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen (1986); Malmendier and Tate (2005)) to divert 
funds or to overinvest. Such arrangements are more likely if the lending bank is repre-
sented on the board so that the board is unlikely to intervene. In this case, investment-
cash flow sensitivity also decreases, but mostly in financially unconstrained firms. 
We test these hypotheses empirically. We find that when commercial bankers join 
the board of a firm, the firm displays less investment-cash flow sensitivity and obtains 
larger loans. The effect depends on affiliation, i.e., directors whose banks have a lending 
relationship with the firm. Moreover, lending increases only for firms that are least finan-
cially constrained, such as firms with investment-grade debt. These firms also appear to 
have worse investment opportunities and lower profitability. Constrained firms receive 
no such assistance. Thus, the additional lending appears to benefit creditors rather than 
shareholders. We find no measurable impact of other, unconflicted financial experts.  
Second, we consider external investment (i.e. mergers and acquisitions) and fi-
nancing with public securities. Here, we focus on investment bankers. We find that firms 
with investment bankers on their boards undertake worse acquisitions. In the 5 days 
around takeover bids, they lose 1% more than firms without investment banker directors. 
They also lose significantly more value over the three years following an acquisition. 
Firms with investment bankers on their board are also associated with larger bond issues, 
in particular if the director’s bank is involved in the deal. And, while investment bankers 
on the board generally seem to reduce underwriting fees, this helping hand is not visible 
when their own bank is involved in the deal. Thus, like commercial bankers, investment 
bankers have a significant impact on corporate decisions, but not necessarily in the inter-
                                                 
5 Consistent with this story, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) find that investment is less sensitive to 
cash flow in Japanese firms with keiretsu membership. Ramirez (1995) finds that firms with J.P. Morgan 
executives on their boards displayed lower investment-cash flow sensitivity at the turn of the 20
th century.   3  
est of shareholders. Again there is little evidence that non-conflicted financial experts 
improve firm policies (or have any impact at all). 
Third, we test for the influence of financial experts on decisions where their out-
side incentives are not in conflict with the interests of shareholders, such as CEO com-
pensation.
6 We find little evidence that financial experts affect decisions without clear 
consequences for their home institutions.  
Our results challenge the view that more financial expertise on corporate boards 
unambiguously improves firm policy. Rather, the benefits have to be weighted against the 
costs due to misaligned incentives. Experts are associated with policies that may create 
value for their financial institutions, but we find little evidence of benefits to sharehold-
ers. Our findings do not imply that financial experts destroy shareholder value on net. 
Companies may benefit from financial expertise on their board through several other 
avenues. Aggrawal and Chadha (2003), for example, find that having directors with a 
CPA, CFA, or similar degree on audit committees translates into fewer earnings restate-
ments. DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) document a positive stock market reaction to the 
appointment of directors with accounting knowledge to the audit committee (though not 
to the appointment of other financial experts). Moreover, our data consists of large, ma-
ture US firms; small early-stage firms, for example, may benefit from the financial exper-
tise of venture capitalists (Hellman and Puri (2000, 2002), Kortum and Lerner (2000)). 
A key concern for any analysis of director effects is the endogeneity of board 
composition, a point made both theoretically and empirically by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998 and 1988), among others.
7 In particular, the causality may be reverse, and firms’ 
financing needs may determine the board representation of financial institutions.
8 Our de-
tailed data allows us to better address these concerns for several reasons.  
First, the fourteen-year time series provides sufficient variation in board composi-
tion to identify commercial banker effects even after controlling for company fixed ef-
fects. Thus, the estimated effect does not reflect time-invariant firm characteristics.  
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the role of directors in setting compensation and of financial expertise (e.g. in under-
standing the value of option grants which are not expensed) see Holmström and Kaplan (2003). 
7 For an extensive review of the literature see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). 
8 Stearns and Mizruchi (1993), Pfeffer (1992), and Booth and Deli (1999) interpret the correlation between 
firm leverage and board presence of bankers as evidence of firms hiring financial directors for their debt 
market expertise.   4  
Second, we are able to instrument for the board presence of commercial bankers, 
using pre-sample shocks to the supply of banker directors. During the banking crisis in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, executives of commercial banks became less suitable 
candidates for corporate boards. As a result, open board positions between 1976 and 1985 
were less likely to be filled with commercial bankers than in other decades, while the 
overall rate of board appointments remained the same. We instrument for the number of 
commercial bankers on the board with the number of current directors hired during the 
crisis period. All results replicate. A placebo instrument, the number of directors ap-
pointed between 1966 and 1975, fails to replicate the results, corroborating our analysis. 
Finally, we can identify and remove company-year observations in which selec-
tion concerns are most severe, such as years with major acquisitions and the first years of 
a banker’s tenure. We show that such years do not drive our results. 
For other financial experts, we cannot use fixed effects in most cases. There is, for 
example, insufficient within-firm variation in acquisitions. We also do not have an in-
strumental variable strategy. As in previous literature, we rely on cross-sectional identifi-
cation and must be cautious about the interpretation of the findings. The endogeneity 
concerns are ameliorated by the discrepancy between high-frequency corporate decisions 
and low-frequency board turnover. (Average director tenure is nine years.) Costs of ter-
mination and search costs make it impractical to adjust board composition for every pol-
icy. Thus, even if a director is chosen to implement a specific policy, firms must consider 
many policy dimensions. For example, a director hired for her debt market expertise will 
also influence executive compensation and acquisition policies. But, her impact on the 
latter decisions may conflict with the preferences of the CEO or the shareholders. 
Our analysis complements a growing literature relating board characteristics to 
firm performance (Fich and Shivdasani (2006); Perry and Peyer (2005)) and extends the 
analysis to specific corporate policies. Our paper relates most closely to Kroszner and 
Strahan (2001a and b), who also study conflicts of interest when commercial bankers sit 
on corporate boards. They find that banker directors are less common in smaller, more 
volatile firms, where conflicts are most severe, and in distressed firms, where legal con-
straints, such as equitable subordination, deter bankers. Our results indicate that conflicts 
of interests still matter in large, stable firms. Consistent with this interpretation, Kracaw   5  
and Zenner (1998) find a negative stock price reaction to bank loans if an affiliate of the 
lending bank sits on the board of the borrower. Morck and Nakamura (1999) show that 
banker directors emphasize policies that favor creditors over shareholders in a dataset on 
Japanese bank ties.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data 
(Section I). In Section II, we investigate the effect of financial expertise on internal in-
vestment and financing policies. In Section III, we study acquisition and public issuance 
decisions. In Section IV, we evaluate the impact of financial expertise on policies which 
preclude conflicts of interests. In Section V, we conclude. 
I. Data 
We analyze a sample of publicly traded companies from 1988 to 2001.
9 We build on the 
dataset of Hall and Liebman (1998) and Yermack (1995), merged with CEO demograph-
ics from Malmendier and Tate (2005). To be included in the original Hall-Liebman sam-
ple, a firm has to appear at least four times on one of the lists of largest US companies 
published by Forbes magazine from 1984 to 1994. We exclude financial firms. 
We hand-collect biographical information on all board members of these compa-
nies using annual proxy statements (1988−1997) and the IRRC database (1998−2001). 
We code each outside director’s main employment into one of the following categories
10: 
(1) commercial bank executive, (2) investment bank executive, (3) executive of a non-
bank financial institution, (4) finance executive (CFO, Accountant, Treasurer, or Vice 
President for Finance), (5) “finance” professor (including finance, economics, account-
ing, and business), (6) consultant, (7) lawyer, (8) executive of a non-financial firm that 
falls outside these categories, and (9) non-corporate worker (including careers in acade-
mia, nonprofit or civil activist organizations, and politics). 
We take additional steps to refine the first two categories, which play a key role in 
the analysis. First, if the description of a bankers’s employer is vague or missing, we 
identify the bank from the FDIC list of US chartered commercial banks and the 
                                                 
9 Our sample period excludes SOX-induced changes. While it would be interesting to evaluate the impact 
of SOX in an extended data set, such an analysis remains currently infeasible since our estimations would 
require multiple post-SOX observations (after the extended compliance deadlines in 2005). The homogene-
ity of pre-SOX data allows us to exploit the full time series for the estimation of financial-expert effects.  
10 The employee falls into more than one category in a few cases, such as banks that are both (1) and (2).   6  
Carter−Manaster IPO underwriter reputation rankings updated by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). To be considered a banker, the director has to be an executive of the bank, not 
just a board member. The exception is when the director retains a seat on the bank’s 
board upon retiring from an executive position. Retired bankers who do not retain a seat 
on the bank’s board, instead, are reclassified in category (8) since they should no longer 
be affected by misaligned incentives.
11 We do the same for retired executives of non-
bank financial institutions. To the extent that the reclassification into the non-banker 
sample is an “over-adjustment”, the resulting measurement error works against finding 
significant effects in our regression analysis. We classify retired directors of categories 
(4) to (9) into the category most in line with their pre-retirement work history. 
The data collection yields 32,943 observations. The summary statistics are in Ta-
ble 1, Panel A. Insiders, i.e. current or former employees of the firm or relatives of execu-
tives, make up 27% of director years. Outsiders from non-financial industries account for 
44% and directors in non-corporate careers for 10%. Financial experts account for 18%, 
with executives of non-bank financial firms the most common (8%) and accountants the 
least (0.5%). Directors are on average 60 years old, have served on the board for 9 years, 
and hold two other directorships. Women account for only 8.5% of director years. 
We transform the sample into firm-years in Panel B. 27% and 16% of the firm-
years, respectively, have a director from a commercial or an investment bank. We denote 
a commercial banker as affiliated if her bank has lent to the firm in the past, as reported 
in the Dealscan database. 22% of the commercial banker-years involve an affiliated 
banker. Financial executives and accountants are present in almost half of firm years 
(46%) and academics with a financial economics background in 18%. 56% of firm years 
contain a director who is an executive of a non-bank financial company. 
We supplement the director data with accounting and financial information from 
COMPUSTAT. The resulting sample contains 2910 firm-year observations of 282 differ-
ent firms. We measure capital as property, plants, and equipment (item 8), investment as 
capital expenditures (item 128), and cash flow as earnings before extraordinary items 
(item 18) plus depreciation (item 14). The latter variable is key to the first part of our 
                                                 
11 In a small number of cases (particularly in the IRRC data), we know only that the director is retired, but 
nothing about their past employment. These directors are classified in category (8).    7  
analysis. It captures how much operating cash a firm generates in a given year.
12 We nor-
malize investment and cash flow by lagged capital.
13 Tobin’s Q is the market value of as-
sets normalized by total assets (item 6), where market value is total assets plus market 
equity (item 25 multiplied by item 199) minus book equity. Book equity is equal to total 
assets minus liabilities (item 181) minus preferred stock liquidating value (item 10) plus 
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item 35) plus convertible debt 
(item 79). If this computation yields no result, we measure book equity as item 60. Return 
on assets (ROA) is income divided by the average of current and lagged total assets, 
where income is earnings before extraordinary items (item 18) plus interest expense (item 
15) plus income statement deferred taxes (data 50), when non-missing, plus investment 
tax credit (data 51), when non-missing. Return on equity (ROE) is net income (item 172) 
scaled by the average of current and lagged book equity.
14 Altman’s (1968) z-score, as 
modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), is defined as 3.3 times the difference in operating 
income before depreciation (item 13) and depreciation and amortization (item 14) plus 
sales (item 12) plus 1.4 times retained earnings (item 36) plus 1.2 times working capital 
(data 121), divided by total assets (item 6). Book leverage is long term debt (item 9) plus 
debt in current liabilities (item 34), divided by long term debt plus debt in current liabili-
ties plus stockholders’ equity (item 216). Market leverage is long term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities, divided by the market value of assets. Board size is the number of di-
rectors. Board independence is the number of outside directors scaled by board size. Fi-
nally, Panel C shows the distribution across the 17 Fama-French industries. 
We also split the sample into firms with and without financial experts on their 
board, separately for each type of expert.
15 Comparing the subsamples with and without 
commercial bankers, we find that firms with commercial bankers on their board are larger 
(in terms of assets), though not significantly so. They also appear to generate more cash 
                                                 
12 We use the standard definition of cash flow in the investment-cash flow literature (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard, 
Peterson (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997)). The capital-structure literature, instead, accounts for 
changes in working capital, though in a different context: in order to calculate the required amount of ex-
ternal financing, cash flow (defined similarly) is subtracted from the sum of changes in working capital, in-
vestment, and dividends. (See, e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
13 Cash flow normalized by capital contains a few extreme values. To avoid the confounding effect of out-
liers on our results, we trim the sample at the 1% level. 
14 Because of extreme outliers, we trim ROE at the 1% level. Winsorizing yields similar results. 
15 Tables with the summary statistics of all subsamples and significance tests are available from the authors. 
All tests of significant differences in means use standard errors that are clustered at the firm level.   8  
flow and to invest more, but the pattern reverses once we normalize by lagged capital. In-
terestingly, both average Q and z-score are higher in the sample without bankers, and 
ROA and ROE are not significantly different, nor are market and book leverage. Thus, 
the summary statistics fail to reveal a systematic pattern of higher profitability or better 
access to capital markets for firms with commercial bankers, as a sorting argument would 
suggest. The pattern is more consistent for the subsamples with and without investment 
bankers. Firms with investment bankers are larger, have a higher investment volume and 
cash flow (even after normalization), and a higher Q, though all differences but one are 
insignificant. ROA and ROE are, again, virtually identical. For the subsamples with and 
without finance executives and accountants, the pattern reverses. Size, investment, cash 
flow, and Q are larger in the subsamples without these types of financial experts. The pat-
tern is similar for the subsamples with and without executives of non-bank financial 
companies and the subsamples with and without finance professors. The most robust 
finding is that average ROA and ROE are virtually identical across all sample splits.  
The sample differences reveal non-random sorting of finance experts, though not 
always according to the traditional sorting story (i.e. into more profitable and less con-
strained firms). The endogeneity underscores the importance of a panel analysis, includ-
ing fixed effects and, where possible, instrumenting for the board presence of experts.  
We supplement our sample with data from CRSP (monthly stock returns), Execu-
comp (CEO compensation), I/B/E/S (analyst coverage), SDC (public debt and equity is-
sues, and acquisitions), and the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan (bank loans). 
II. Internal Investment and Loan Financing 
The core question of this paper is whether board members with financial expertise affect 
corporate policies and, if so, whether affiliation distorts their impact. 
A. Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow 
We begin our analysis by investigating the impact of finance experts on internal invest-
ment and financing decisions. We estimate the standard model of internal investment: 
it it it it it it it
it it it it it
CF X X CF Q Q
CF FIN FIN CF I
ε β β β β
β β β α
+ + + + +
+ + + =
− − * ' ' *
* ' '  
7 6 1 5 1 4
3 2 1  
The model determines investment as a function of firm and board characteristics. CF is   9  
cash flow, FIN the set of dummies for finance experts, Q Tobin’s Q, and X an array of 
other controls, including the natural logarithms of firm and board size, the fraction of out-
side directors and fixed effects for year, S&P long term debt rating, and firm or industry. 
Industries are the Fama and French 48 industry groups. We test for the significance of β3. 
To correct for heteroskedasticity and correlation of errors within firms, we cluster stan-
dard errors at the firm level.
16 This adjustment makes a substantial difference given the 
slow evolution of board composition and autocorrelation in capital expenditures.  
Column I of Table 2 presents the baseline regression without banker indicators. 
As in prior studies, both cash flow and Q positively predict investment. The ratio of out-
side directors is negatively related to investment. Column II includes the dummies for fi-
nancial experts. The cash-flow, Q, and board-independence coefficients vary little, and 
none of the financial-expert dummies are significant. The interaction of commercial 
banker and cash flow, however, has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. It is also economically significant: baseline investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity, evaluated at the mean of the continuous explanatory variables, with all expertise 
variables at 0, and for the baseline year (1988), industry (agriculture), and S&P credit rat-
ing (none), is $0.36. Adding a commercial banker to the board decreases this sensitivity 
by 32%, or $0.12. For other finance experts, the coefficient estimates on the interaction 
terms are insignificant and much smaller in magnitude. All results are robust to variations 
in the financial-expert variables such as using fractions or counts instead of dummies. 
Thus, the presence of commercial bankers is associated with lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, but none of the other types of financial experts appear to matter. 
The main difficulty in interpreting these findings is unobserved firm heterogene-
ity. One interpretation is that commercial bankers induce lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. An alternative interpretation is that firms with low investment-cash flow sen-
sitivity seek bankers as directors. Or, bankers may decline directorships in firms that are 
investment-cash flow sensitive. The latter is particularly plausible if firms with higher in-
vestment-cash flow sensitivity are in financial distress. In these firms, the legal principles 
of equitable subordination and lender liability may deter a lending bank from board rep-
resentation since involvement in active management impairs the bank’s claims in case of 
                                                 
16 We cluster standard errors throughout the paper, even where it is not explicitly noted in the text.   10  
bankruptcy (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001a).
17  
The latter selection concern is mitigated in our data since the legal constraints ap-
ply only in the case of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is unlikely for our sample firms as, for 
example, indicated by the 2.05 average z-score (and 1.93 median).
18 Moreover, the aver-
age z-score is even higher in firms without commercial bankers (2.14) than in those with 
commercial bankers (1.81). Nevertheless, the broader selection concern remains, and we 
take several steps to address it. 
First, we exploit within-firm variation in the board presence of bankers. In 55 
cases, the COMBANKER dummy variable changes from 0 to 1, and in 93 cases from 1 to 
0. The value of COMBANKER shows time-series variation in 104 out of 282 firms. In 
Column III, we add firm fixed effects, and in Column IV we also include (firm)*(cash 
flow) interactions. The decrease in cash flow sensitivity among larger firms now becomes 
significant. The negative effect of COMBANKER on cash flow sensitivity is diminished 
in magnitude and precision though still significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
As we will see in Section II.B, the reduced effect is due to constrained firms in which 
commercial bankers do little to influence firm policy. The positive effect of COM-
BANKER on investment also becomes significant. The positive level effect combines 
with the negative sensitivity to produce an overall increase of 2.5% (Column III) and 5% 
(Column IV) from the mean of capital-scaled investment.  
The robustness of our findings to the inclusion of firm-fixed effects leaves two 
possible interpretations. Either commercial bankers on the board reduce the sensitivity of 
investment to internal funds, or the results reflect time-varying firm characteristics. Firms 
may ask bankers to join boards precisely when they are seeking external financing and to 
depart when scaling back investment. And bankers may agree to join boards only if (and 
as long as) they foresee a profitable financing opportunity.  
Before we address this alternative explanation directly, we note that the low de-
gree of variation in board size (within firms) undermines its plausibility. Investment and 
financing vary a lot within firms, but board size remains constant, from one year to the 
                                                 
17 Board representation is not sufficient for such impairment; see Sprayregen, Friedland and Mayer (2003) 
and Douglas (2003). 
18 We report the modified z-score of MacKie-Mason (1990). Using the formula from Altman (1968), the 
overall sample mean is 3.74 and falls well within the “safe zone” (cutoff = 3). The scores for firms with and 
without commercial bankers are 3.07 and 3.98, respectively.   11  
next, in 45% of all firm-years. The median change in board size from year to year is 0; 
the mean change is -0.102 (with a standard deviation of 1.296). Figure 1 shows that mean 
and median board size are, if anything, decreasing over our sample period. Moreover, di-
rector tenure is long, with a mean of nine years. Thus, the turnover of directors appears 
too low and “out of sync” with high-frequency corporate decisions to represent task- or 
policy-specific entry and exit. If directors are hired to implement specific policy changes, 
then most of their time on the board is likely to occur after those policies are in effect.  
Nevertheless, we address this concern in several ways. If directors are hired to 
help implement a specific firm policy, their impact should be mainly felt in their first one 
or two years on the board. Thus, as a first robustness check, we recode the COM-
BANKER dummy as 0 in those years. Replicating Table 2, we find qualitatively similar 
results. For example, removing the first two years of a banker’s board tenure, we find 
cash flow sensitivities of -0.121, -0.084, and -0.054 respectively in the three specifica-
tions (with significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels). Second, we identify years with 
major policy changes that are more plausible candidates for selective board appointments. 
Specifically, we remove the three years around major acquisitions, i.e. acquisitions with 
transaction values of at least 15% of the market value of the acquirer’s assets. Our results 
are again qualitatively unchanged.
19 These robustness checks suggest that timed director 
selection is unlikely to drive the estimated banker effect.  
Finally, we instrument for the board presence of commercial bankers. We exploit 
the commercial-banking crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s as a source of exogenous 
variation in board composition. When legislative changes during the 1970s and 1980s al-
lowed greater competition in the banking industry, banks raised interest rates on demand 
deposits inducing greater risk taking on the asset side of their balance sheets. Many of 
these risks failed to pay off. The sovereign debt crises in developing countries like Brazil, 
Mexico and Argentina and the end of the real estate boom in the 1980s eroded bank prof-
itability. Beginning in the second half of the 1970s and continuing through the 1980s, the 
commercial banking industry went into crisis. The frequency of bank failure exploded 
(Park (1994)). As executives of failed commercial banks exited the potential director 
                                                 
19 Table available from the authors. We also check directly how frequently major acquisitions lead to board 
restructuring. We find only 6 cases of bankers entering or exiting in the 3 years around the acquisitions.   12  
pool, the number of commercial bankers available to firms appointing new directors de-
clined. As a result, firms that happened to appoint more directors during the 1976-1985 
decade are likely to have fewer commercial bankers serving on the board. Our instrument 
for the number of commercial bankers serving on the board, then, is the number of cur-
rent directors who were appointed between 1976 and 1985. 
The validity of the instrument relies on the implicit assumption that board turn-
over between 1976 and 1985 is not different from other periods. If firms hired at a higher 
or lower rate during the crisis period, then the same shock that precipitated board restruc-
turing might also explain changes in investment. We find, however, that the year-by-year 
distribution of directors’ tenure is stable. In every single year, the median is 7 years. In 
addition, the 25
th and 10
th percentiles of the tenure distribution are identical in all sample 
years, and the 75
th and 90
th percentile vary at most by one year in either direction. 
Another potential concern about the instrument is that it may capture variation in 
director tenure across firms. For example, well-run firms may have low board turnover, 
resulting in both low values of the instrument and low investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
We address this concern directly by including mean board tenure and its interaction with 
cash flow in our regressions.
20 We also account for industry-specific patterns in board re-
structuring and investment-cash flow sensitivity by including dummies for the 48 Fama-
French industry groups and their interactions with cash flow. These controls address, for 
example, responses to industry-specific takeover pressure.
21 Since our instrument mainly 
exploits variation in board appointments across firms, there is insufficient within-firm 
variation to include firm fixed effects. 
It is important to acknowledge remaining concerns about excludability of the in-
                                                 
20 Another way to address concerns that the CRISIS variable captures firms that are poorly run is to add ad-
ditional controls for firm governance and its interaction with cash flow. We re-estimate our regressions in-
cluding the number of outsiders on the board as an additional control and find little impact on the results. 
We have also added age and its interaction with cash flow since the definition of CRISIS places restrictions 
on directors’ age. The results are unaffected. Finally, the results are robust to interacting the tenure variable 
with age and, in turn, with cash flow. This addresses the argument that not only long tenure, but also being 
young and active affects director effectiveness (and might be captured by the CRISIS variable). 
Another concern might be that the tenure control variable is skewed given the slow rate of board turnover. 
We find, however, that mean board tenure exhibits little skewness in the data, with a mean of 9.82, a me-
dian of 9.25, and a standard deviation of 3.91. Moreover, the results of the regression in Table 4 become 
slightly stronger when using median tenure (and age) and are robust to including quadratic terms in median 
tenure and age and their interactions with cash flow.  
21 We also address the concern about takeover pressure directly and re-estimate the model starting in 1990 
(after the takeover pressure largely subsided). We find again similar results.   13  
strument from the investment regression. Ideally, firms would be differently affected by 
the banking crisis only through the channel of director selection. The banking crisis does 
not provide such a clean experiment. Director appointments between 1976 and 1985, 
however, are unlikely to affect investment during our later 1988-2001 sample period.  
In Table 3, we present the results of two-stage least squares regressions. As with 
board size, we use the natural logarithms of one plus the number of current directors ap-
pointed in 1976-85 (CRISIS) and one plus the number of commercial bankers on the 
board (#COMBANKER). CRISIS and CRISIS interacted with cash flow instrument for 
the number of commercial bankers and its interaction with cash flow.
22 We do not in-
clude other financial experts, since their estimated impacts were consistently small and 
insignificant and we do not have appropriate instruments. Column I replicates the base-
line regression using the number of commercial bankers rather than our earlier indicator 
variable. In Columns II and III, we report the first stage regressions of the number of 
commercial bankers and its cash-flow interaction on CRISIS and its cash-flow interac-
tion. The instruments are correlated with the variables for which they instrument. Wald 
tests reject, at the 1% level, that the coefficients on CRISIS and (CRISIS)*(CF) are 
jointly equal to zero. Column IV shows the investment model after instrumenting for 
#COMBANKER and its cash-flow interaction. As in the baseline regression in Column I, 
Q is positively related to investment, while board independence is a negative predictor of 
investment, but a positive predictor of investment-cash flow sensitivity. The estimated ef-
fect of board tenure remains small and marginally significant with the opposite pattern: a 
positive effect on investment and a negative effect on its cash flow sensitivity. The level 
effect of #COMBANKER loses its significance. Most importantly, the coefficient on 
(#COMBANKER)*(CF) is again negative and marginally significant (at the 10% level). 
Evaluated at the mean and for the baseline year (1988), industry (agriculture), and S&P 
credit rating (none), investment increases by $0.41 for each dollar of cash flow. Adding a 
standard deviation of commercial banker presence to the board decreases this sensitivity 
by 30 cents, meaning that $1 of cash flow increases investment by only $0.11. 
As a placebo test, we repeat the two-stage least-squares regressions using direc-
                                                 
22 We use the number of bankers (rather than the dummy) in the instrument regressions, since a binary en-
dogenous variable would induce non-classical measurement error.   14  
tors appointed between 1966 and 1975 in lieu of the instrument. Since this era pre-dated 
the commercial banking crisis, the results should not replicate. Indeed, we find that both 
the first and second stages fail. This uniqueness strengthens the argument that the CRISIS 
variables matter because of the proposed banking crisis channel and enhances the validity 
of our instrument. Moreover, the placebo instrument provides direct evidence that CRI-
SIS does not simply capture the effect of “stable and long-lasting directorship.”  
We conclude that commercial bankers significantly reduce companies’ sensitivity 
of investment to internal resources. We detect no such impact for other financial experts. 
B. Is Less Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity More Efficient? 
We now ask whether the impact of bankers on investment benefits shareholders. We also 
explore the channel of the bankers’ influence. 
The reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivity is open to different interpreta-
tions. If investment-cash flow sensitivity reflects capital market imperfections, then 
bankers may mitigate financing frictions. Their boardroom presence may, for example, 
reduce information asymmetries and facilitate financing for valuable projects. If invest-
ment-cash flow sensitivity is due to a managerial propensity to over-invest out of free 
cash flow, bankers may increase value by acting as monitors and inducing firms to cut 
(over-)investment when internal cash flow is high. On the other hand, bankers might de-
stroy value by providing additional funds to managers and allowing them to over-invest 
when cash flow is low. The latter story is plausible since bankers have little incentive to 
induce efficient investment, given the low shareholdings of U.S. banks relative to their 
loan volume (Gorton and Winton (2003)). Bankers may back inefficient but low-risk pro-
jects to benefit their own banks, possibly against the interest of shareholders. 
1. Financing Constraints 
To test these hypotheses, we first examine financial constraints. If the decrease in in-
vestment-cash flow sensitivity is the result of better access to external financing and less 
underinvestment, it should be most prominent when firms are financially constrained.  
There is little consensus on the best way to measure financial constraints. We em-
ploy several different proxies, proposed in previous literature. First, we construct the 
Kaplan-Zingles (KZ) index for our sample, following standard practice (Lamont, Polk, 
and Saá-Requejo, 2001; Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005).   15  
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that simple proxies like firm size and dividend payout 
do not capture financing constraints.
23 They measure financial constraints by using both 
quantitative (accounting variables) and qualitative data (annual proxies, interviews with 
managers, etc). They estimate a logit regression to construct an index of financial con-
straints based on the KZ coefficient estimates: 
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where CF is cash flow, K capital, Q Tobin’s Q, and C cash and short-term investments. 
Higher KZ values indicate greater financial constraint. We use the sample median of the 
lagged KZ index to split firm years into constrained and unconstrained subsamples. 
The KZ index is not without shortcomings. In particular, it assumes that the index 
weights generalize beyond the original sample of manufacturing firms. Using the index to 
split the sample, rather than as a continuous measure, mitigates concerns about measure-
ment error. Nevertheless, to check the robustness of our results, we consider three alter-
native proxies.
24 First, we use investment-grade long term debt ratings (BBB and above) 
as an indicator of smooth access to external capital.
25 Second, we use the number of ana-
lysts following the stock. Third, we use the degree of disagreement among analysts, 
measured by the standard deviation of quarterly earnings estimates in the quarter ending 
before the annual proxy meeting. The last two proxies address the concern that the KZ 
index and (indirectly) bond ratings may indicate financial distress rather than constraints. 
Analyst-based proxies more directly capture informational asymmetries as a source of ex-
ternal finance constraints.
26 The alternative proxies lead to largely similar (and sometimes 
stronger) results.
27 For brevity, we report only the estimates using the KZ index. 
Before turning to the split-sample regressions, we compare the subsamples of 
                                                 
23 Using model-generated data, Moyen (2004) shows that firms with low dividends – considered to be more 
financially constrained in several studies – are in fact more likely to be unconstrained. 
24 An extensive list of classification schemes can be found in Hubbard’s (1998) review article. 
25 See, among others, Kashyap, Lamont, Stein (1994); Calomiris, Himmelberg, Wachtel (1995); Hubbard, 
Kuttner, Palia (2002). When using credit ratings, we drop firms that do not have rated debt. 
26 Other papers using analyst coverage or analyst disagreement for financial constraints or informational 
asymmetry include Chang, Dasgupta, Hilary (2006); Ajinkya and Gift (1985). 
27 Tables are available upon request.   16  
constrained and unconstrained firm-years and calculate differences in means.
28 Interest-
ingly, in the constrained subsample average assets ($8.8bn), capital ($4.7bn) and invest-
ment ($0.7bn) are larger than in the unconstrained subsample ($6.9bn, $2.1bn, and 
$0.4bn respectively). Cash flow is smaller, though not significantly ($0.7bn versus 
$0.8bn). The difference becomes significant and large after normalizing by lagged capi-
tal. Book and market leverage are significantly larger in constrained firms. The differ-
ences in (normalized) cash flow and leverage reflect their role in determining the KZ 
split. The average z-score is significantly lower in the constrained subsample (1.53) than 
in the unconstrained subsample (2.57) confirming, on the one hand, that the KZ index 
captures constraints. On the other hand, the z-scores illustrate that the difference between 
“constrained” and “unconstrained” is not to be confused with “financially troubled” and 
“financially healthy.” Both z-scores are significantly different, at the 1% level, from 1. 
Thus, bankruptcy considerations are unlikely to have bite in either subsample.
29 
The summary statistics also speak to the concern that bankers select into uncon-
strained firms. Commercial bankers are present on the board in 30% of the constrained 
subsample and 26% of the unconstrained sample. There are no significant differences in 
the presence of any type of financial expert among the two subsamples of constrained and 
unconstrained firms. This result may reflect the frequency with which firms move be-
tween subsamples while bankers appointed to the board remain directors:  Out of the 282 
firms, 132 make at least one switch from “constrained” to “unconstrained” or vice versa.  
Table 4 presents the split-sample regressions. In Columns I and II, we replicate 
the most stringent specification of Table 2 (Column IV, including firm effects and firm-
cash flow interactions) for both subsamples. Note that, in this specification, we cannot 
easily interpret the coefficient of cash flow. It depends on which firm dummy we omit 
from the regression, and it captures only the sensitivity of that one firm. We find that 
bankers significantly reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash flow when firms are un-
constrained rather than when they are constrained. Also, the positive level effect of 
COMBANKER is present only in the unconstrained subsample. As before, none of the 
                                                 
28 All tests of significant differences in means use standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. 
29 We have also used the formula from Altman (1968) to place our firms within the standard “zones of dis-
crimination.” In the constrained subsample, the mean Altman’s z-score is 2.47 and in the unconstrained 
sample it is 5.09. Both scores are well above the 1.8 cutoff for the “distress zone.”    17  
other financial experts exert a significant level or interaction effect. 
These results cast doubt on the hypothesis that bankers help to solve information 
problems between firms and capital markets. In the subset of firms most likely to be af-
fected by informational asymmetries, commercial bankers do not exert significant influ-
ence on investment and financing. They only matter in unconstrained firms. 
The value consequences of reduced investment-cash flow sensitivity in uncon-
strained firms, however, remain ambiguous. Commercial bankers may prevent the abuse 
of funds when cash flow is high. Or, they may provide additional funds to empire-
building managers when free cash flow is low. In the next subsection, we analyze lending 
and lending affiliation to disentangle the different interpretations.  
2. Lending and Lending Affiliation 
We start the analysis of bank lending by testing whether banker directors (efficiently) 
provide additional loans to constrained firms, which the investment model fails to cap-
ture. We also test whether bankers on the board provide additional lending to uncon-
strained firms. Increased lending to unconstrained firms would suggest that commercial 
bankers reduce sensitivity of investment to cash flow by providing funds when cash flow 
is low rather than by restricting (over-)investment when cash flow is high. Finally, we 
test whether the reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivity among unconstrained firms 
is due to affiliated bankers, whose banks originate loans to the firm. A positive result 
would directly confirm the importance of the lending mechanism. 
We use the Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan database to obtain detailed in-
formation on loan terms and lenders (see Güner (2006)). Table 5 summarizes the data. 
We consider a banker-director affiliated if her bank is a member of the lending syndicate. 
Of the 1,288 loans where the loan size is available, 89 are obtained by firms with an af-
filiated commercial banker on the board. In 46 of these deals the director’s bank acts as a 
lead manager. 223 deals are obtained by firms with only unaffiliated commercial bankers 
and 976 by firms without a commercial banker director. The first column of p-values (“p-
value (A-U)”) reveals that none of the board-composition and other firm variables have 
significantly different means in the Affiliated and Unaffiliated samples. Q is insignifi-
cantly lower in the Affiliated sample (p=0.15), suggestive of worse investment opportuni-
ties. The statistics on tranche and spreads suggest that affiliated deals are larger (signifi-  18  
cant with p = 0.03), but also more expensive (insignificant at p = 0.15). The same is true 
comparing affiliated deals to deals in firms without commercial bankers on the board. 
(Here, both differences are significant with p-values of 0.03 and 0.05, respectively). 
To isolate the banker effect, we regress loan size on the presence of bankers, con-
trolling for an array of firm, board, and deal characteristics. The firm and board controls 
are the logarithm of firm total assets; Tobin’s Q; plant, property, and equipment over as-
sets; stock volatility; leverage; log board size; and the ratio of independent directors on 
the board. The contract controls are designed to capture borrower risk, which in turn af-
fects loan pricing. As in previous literature
30, we use the logarithm of the days between 
contract initiation and maturity, a dummy for origination by a syndicate rather than a sole 
lender, number of lenders in the syndicate, and indicators for seniority and security of the 
loan. (See the Appendix for more details on these variables.) We also include fixed ef-
fects for S&P credit ratings, year, and industry or firm. 
Table 6 presents the regression results. Column I shows that commercial bankers 
on the board are associated with an increase in loan size of $346.7m. The coefficient on 
the investment banker dummy is also positive, though smaller and not significant. The 
coefficients on all other expertise dummies are much smaller in magnitude and insignifi-
cant. Among all firm, board, and deal characteristics, only firm size and the number of 
lenders are significant (positive). In Column II we test the extent to which affiliated and 
unaffiliated bankers contribute to the positive effect on loan size. We estimate a (signifi-
cant) coefficient of $458.4m for affiliated bankers and an (insignificant) coefficient of 
295.7 for unaffiliated bankers. The difference is not significantly different from zero (p-
value = 0.2273). The size and affiliation effects are larger in magnitude if we include firm 
fixed effects ($510m and $643m), but are insignificant with p-values of 0.20 and 0.12. 
In untabulated regressions, we also test whether the effects are stronger when the 
director’s bank is the lead manager of the lending syndicate and thus likely to determine 
the loan terms. Affiliated LEAD COMBANKER has a coefficient of $674m (p-value = 
0.08), compared to $229m for Affiliated PARTICIPANT BANK (p-value = 0.094), but 
the difference is again insignificant (p-value = 0.283). The results are similar with firm 
fixed effects.  
                                                 
30 E.g., Kroszner and Strahan (2001b); Hubbard, Kuttner, and Palia (2002).   19  
As in our analysis of investment, we check whether additional lending is directed 
towards financially constrained or unconstrained firms, using the overall sample median 
of the KZ index to split the sample. The results are in Columns III-VI of Table 6. We find 
that the loan increase is largely driven by unconstrained firms. In the model with industry 
fixed effects and the unconstrained subsample, affiliated loans are on average $911m lar-
ger (p-value = 0.03) than unaffiliated loans. The coefficient estimate on Unaffiliated 
COMBANKER is instead $500m (p-value = 0.18). The difference is not statistically sig-
nificant (p-value = 0.12). The affiliated banker effect in the constrained sample, however, 
is significantly smaller: the p-value of the difference in affiliated lending in constrained 
and unconstrained firms ($213m versus $911m) is 0.09. With firm fixed effects (Columns 
V and VI), the results are similar. Only the difference between affiliated and unaffiliated 
bankers in unconstrained firms is less pronounced.
31  
Overall, we consistently find significantly larger bank loans when commercial 
bankers are present on the board. The estimated effect is larger for affiliated than for un-
affiliated deals, though the difference is statistically insignificant. However, the estimated 
effect of affiliated bankers is significantly stronger in unconstrained firms than in con-
strained firms. These findings mirror our investment cash flow sensitivity results. To-
gether, the results are hard to reconcile with the hypotheses that bankers on the board 
ease inefficient financing constraints or provide superior monitoring (i.e. curb wasteful 
investment when free cash flow is high), at least on average. They are, however, consis-
tent with the hypothesis that bankers lend in the best interest of the bank.  
We corroborate these results by merging the information about banker affiliation 
from the loan data with our earlier firm-year sample to test for the effect of affiliation in 
the investment-cash flow framework. We classify a commercial banker director as “af-
filiated” if her bank has lent to the firm in the past, including participation in a syndi-
cate.
32 In Columns III and IV of Table 4, we re-estimate the split sample results of Col-
                                                 
31 Notably, the investment banker effect also becomes significant in the fixed effects regressions. 
32 We also designed two alternative classification schemes to check whether, instead of capturing the im-
pact of a banker-director, the estimated effect is due to a pre-existing bank-firm relationship. First, we cre-
ate a third category of “grey” commercial bankers who join a firm with a pre-existing lending relationship 
with their bank. Isolating them does not change the estimated impact of (the remaining) affiliated bankers. 
Second, we drop firm years that contain banker-directors who we cannot classify due to the censoring of 
Dealscan before 1988. Our initial scheme classifies bankers who are already on the board in 1988 as unaf-
filiated (until the first affiliated loan), to bias against an affiliation result. The results are, again, similar.   20  
umns I and II with separate dummies for affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers. 
This specification includes firm effects and the interactions of firm effects with cash 
flow. In the constrained subsample, the coefficients on both banker cash flow interactions 
(affiliated and unaffiliated) are positive, though insignificant. In the unconstrained sub-
sample, instead, both coefficients are negative and significant. The affiliated banker in-
teraction (-0.378), however, is significantly larger than the unaffiliated banker interaction 
(-0.081). The difference is significant with a p-value of 0.05. Thus, even though the direct 
effect of affiliation on lending is not conclusive, the reduction in cash flow sensitivity de-
pends on a lending relationship with the director’s bank.  
3. Investment Opportunities, Earnings and Capital Structure 
To gain additional insights into the value implications of increased lending, we examine 
whether firms that receive extra funding from banker directors have profitable investment 
opportunities. We also ask whether the extra lending provides benefits to shareholders 
that valuation ratios fail to capture, such as an improved capital structure.  
In an ideal empirical analysis, we would evaluate whether the marginal project fi-
nanced with a director-banker’s loan creates or destroys value. Two data limitations 
hamper such an analysis. First, we cannot link loans to specific projects. Second, we can-
not link specific projects to their marginal returns. Thus, we are limited to considering the 
joint effect of lending on all ongoing projects and the resulting overall performance. 
Thus, even when the marginal contribution of a loan-financed project is negative, we 
might find a positive mean performance. In the context of external investment, i.e. acqui-
sitions (see Section III.A), we will be able to separate these effects since we can identify 
the timing and return implications of distinct acquisitions.  
In the context of internal investment, we partially remedy these limitations using 
industry performance as the hypothetical counterfactual (i.e., the returns to investment 
without the additional lending and resulting additional investment). Firm by firm and 
year by year, we subtract the median industry value from the performance measure. We 
use four measures: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin’s Q, and 
Altman’s z-score. We use the 48 Fama and French industry groups unless there are less   21  
than five sample firms in an industry.
33 We consider a seven-year window around loans 
(year -3 to year +3, with year 0 indicating the year of borrowing) and calculate the mean 
industry-adjusted value of each performance measure, separately for each group of bor-
rowers, in each year.
34 We also evaluate the performance of firms with affiliated loans 
relative to borrowers with no or only unaffiliated bankers on their boards.  
The left column of Figure 2 displays the performance of unconstrained firms.
35 
Starting with accounting performance, we find that firms with affiliated loans perform 
equal to or insignificantly worse than the industry benchmark in each year prior to lend-
ing and significantly worse post lending, in years 1 and 2 for ROA and years 1 and 3 for 
ROE. Firms with bank loans but unaffiliated bankers, instead, outperform their industries 
in every year prior to and post lending, significantly so in most years. The performance of 
firms without bankers on their boards is indistinguishable from the industry benchmark. 
These results suggest that additional lending through affiliated bankers is not justified by 
better ongoing or subsequent earnings. Affiliated borrowers perform persistently worse 
than industry peers or unaffiliated borrowers.  
In addition, the trend in accounting returns post-lending is worse for affiliated 
borrowers. The difference in industry-adjusted ROA between affiliated-banker and no-
banker borrowing firms is insignificant in all years prior to the loan and in the year of the 
loan, ameliorating concerns about firm heterogeneity prior to lending. In the year after 
the loan, instead, the difference is marginally significant (p=0.09). The effect tails off in 
years 2 and 3 (p=0.11 and p=0.26). Thus the year after the loan marks a unique change in 
relative performance. ROE displays a similar trend: The magnitude of the difference is at 
its minimum in year –2 (0.003), increases to its maximum in year 0 (0.097), and remains 
steady at roughly 0.06 thereafter.
36  
We also find a decline in performance from the year prior to the loan to the year 
after the loan among affiliated borrowers. Industry adjusted ROA declines by 0.017 (p = 
0.07) and ROE by 0.032 (p = 0.05). Over longer horizons (year –1 to year +2 or year +3), 
                                                 
33 If there are fewer than five sample firms in an industry category, the Fama-French 17 group is used. If 
there are fewer than five sample firms in any of these groups, the Fama-French 12 group is used. 
34 We confirmed the robustness of our results to using medians. 
35 Tables of the means and of all differences-in-means tests are available from the authors. 
36 In this case, the estimates are more precise: the difference between firms with affiliated bankers and no 
bankers is statistically significant in all but year –2.   22  
the slopes remain negative, though the statistical significance diminishes (only ROE over 
–1 to +3 is marginally significant).  
Turning to the next measure, Tobin’s Q, we find that the market perceives firms 
with affiliated loans to have the worst investment opportunities throughout the seven-year 
window. In each year, unaffiliated borrowers and borrowers without bankers outperform 
their industries, while affiliated bankers underperform. The differences between affili-
ated-banker and no-banker firms are statistically significant and strongest in the years 
leading up to the lending decisions, at the 1% or 5% level in year -3 to year 0, suggesting 
worse investment opportunities prior to the loan. The difference between affiliated and 
unaffiliated loans is marginally significant in year -2 and has p-values ranging from 0.1 to 
0.14 in the other three years prior to (and including) the loan year.  
Finally, firms with affiliated loans have persistently lower z-scores than the indus-
try norm and than each of the other subgroups of borrowers, though the differences are 
small and insignificant in most years. 
The right column of Figure 2 shows that the performance of constrained firms 
does not differ across types of lending for any of the four performance measures. 
Thus, among financially unconstrained firms the additional bank loans to affili-
ated borrowers neither reflect superior investment opportunities prior to the loan nor ap-
pear to generate higher earnings after the loan. Firms that obtain bank loans from their di-
rectors’ banks are significantly worse performers and have worse investment opportuni-
ties, both compared to the industry and to other borrowers. We must, however, be cau-
tious in interpreting the results, given the measurement issues outlined above. 
As a final step, we ask whether affiliated lending provides benefits to sharehold-
ers that the valuation ratios fail to capture. In particular, lending might move a firm’s 
capital structure closer to an optimal level. Graham (2000) finds, for example, that firms 
tend to use debt too conservatively relative to its tax benefits. The pattern is particularly 
true of large, liquid, and profitable firms with low distress costs, i.e., precisely the type of 
firm in our unconstrained subsample. This interpretation would require the additional 
loans to affect leverage rather than, e.g., substituting for other types of debt.  
We test for significant and persistent increases in firm leverage following (affili-
ated) loans to unconstrained firms. We use the definitions of book and market leverage   23  
from Section I and also check the robustness of the results to using the following alterna-
tive definitions: the difference in assets and book equity divided by assets for book lever-
age and divided by assets minus book equity plus market equity for market leverage. We 
regress the post-borrowing change in leverage on the banker dummies and controls for 
the change in the ratio of plant, property and equipment over total assets; change in 
Tobin’s Q; change in the natural logarithm of sales; change in ROA; and the natural log 
of board size. We also include year and the Fama-French 17 industry dummies.
37  
We find that affiliated bankers lead to a significantly larger increase in book lev-
erage (using either measure) from the end of the fiscal year prior to borrowing to the end 
of the first full fiscal year after borrowing than non-banker directors. The difference be-
tween unaffiliated and affiliated bankers, however, is not statistically significant and dis-
appears by the end of the third year following the loan. Moreover, there are few signifi-
cant estimates if we consider market rather than book leverage. Finally, the results are not 
robust to minor changes in variable definitions; e.g., the treatment of directors whose 
bank had a lending relationship with the firm prior to their appointment to the board. 
In summary, there is little evidence that the larger loans provided by affiliated 
bankers carry through to leverage. Even the effect on book leverage appears to be short-
lived and not part of a systematic strategy to raise leverage.  
In light of these results and the performance results one might wonder whether the 
extra lending is actually in the interests of creditors. If extra lending induces firms to un-
dertake value-destroying projects, it might also increase the likelihood of default. Figure 
2 reveals that, even post-borrowing, the mean z-score among affiliated borrowers never 
drops below 1.5. In unreported estimations, we confirm that affiliated lending does not 
increase default probability relative to unaffiliated lending or lending when banker direc-
tors are not present, as measured by changes in S&P credit ratings or distance to default. 
The findings overall suggest that bank executives use their directorships to in-
crease lending, but mainly to firms with low financial constraints and credit risk, coupled 
with poor internal investment opportunities. On average, they appear more likely to fa-
cilitate overinvestment than to correct inefficient underinvestment. 
                                                 
37 The results are also robust to including credit rating dummies, as elsewhere in the paper.   24  
III. External Investment and Public Debt Financing 
Turning from internal to external investment decisions, we ask whether directors with fi-
nancial expertise affect mergers and acquisitions, especially since major acquisitions re-
quire board approval. The type of financial experts most likely to affect acquisition deci-
sions are investment bankers. Investment bankers are also most likely to be involved in 
public securities issues. Both as underwriters and (potential) advisors to acquisitions, they 
face incentive conflicts similar to those facing commercial lenders: they are charged both 
with maximizing bank profits and shareholder value. 
A. Acquisitions 
First, we ask whether directors with financial expertise help to prevent value-destroying 
acquisitions. By analyzing abnormal returns to merger bids, we can assess directly the 
impact of expertise on shareholder value. We use SDC data on completed mergers in 
which the acquirer obtains more than 50% of the target shares and with a deal value of 
more than $5m. Similar to previous literature (e.g. Baker and Savasoglu, 2002), we ex-
clude leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, self-tenders, acquisitions of subsidiaries, spin-
offs, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake purchases, privatizations, and acquisi-
tions of remaining interests.  
The summary statistics are in Panel A of Table 7. About 30% of the target firms 
are publicly traded, compared to less than 7% in the raw SDC data. The average target 
value is $214m, 7% of the acquirer’s total assets. In 16% of the acquiring companies, in-
vestment bankers sit on the board; in 26% commercial bankers. Panel A also shows the 
differences between acquiring firms with and without investment bankers on the board. 
(and p-values from t-tests, with clustering at the industry level). Targets acquired by 
firms with investment-banker directors are significantly more likely to be public and are 
larger, both in absolute dollar terms and as a percentage of the acquirer’s size. The pres-
ence of commercial bankers and executives of non-bank financial institutions do not vary 
significantly, but firms with investment bankers are less likely to have outside finance 
executives and accountants or to have finance professors on their board. In untabulated 
probit regressions, we also find that, controlling for an array of firm characteristics and 
fixed effects (Fama-French 48 industries, year, and credit rating), firms with investment 
bankers on the board acquire at roughly the same frequency as other firms.   25  
As a first step towards assessing the value implications of mergers with and with-
out investment-banker directors, we analyze the announcement effects. We compute cu-
mulative abnormal returns over a five-day window around the announcement date as the 
sum of the daily difference between raw returns and the CRSP value-weighted index re-
turns.
38 The mean CAR is –1.33% (p = 0.04) in firms with investment bankers and –
0.32% (p = 0.25) in firms without. The difference has a p-value of 0.11. The difference in 
medians is identical, 1.01 percentage points. The 1.33% decline in the investment banker 
subsample is three times as large as the average CAR in the overall sample. 
In Panel B, we move to a regression framework. We relate cumulative abnormal 
returns to the presence of each type of finance expert on the board, controlling for board 
size, board independence as well as year, industry and credit-rating fixed effects. The re-
sults confirm the pattern in the means. The estimated impact of investment bankers is –
1 ppt, marginally significant at the 10% level. The result loses significance after introduc-
ing more merger-specific controls – dummies for the type of financing and whether the 
acquisition is diversifying – but the size of the estimated effect remains the same (–1 ppt). 
We also find that the effect is driven by private targets. For the subsample of private tar-
gets, the size of the investment-banker effect doubles and becomes significant at the 5% 
level. For public targets, there is no effect. These differences may reflect the more subjec-
tive valuation of private targets. The value consequences of mergers with private targets 
are less obvious, making it easier for management or investment bankers to direct the 
board and shareholders towards approval of value-destroying mergers.  
We also estimate a significantly positive effect of 0.8 ppt for non-bank finance 
executives in the full sample. And, financial executives and accountants have a positive 
effect (1 ppt) in the sample of private targets. This result is consistent with a positive gov-
ernance role for financial executives and accountants, who are often identified as ideal di-
rectors (Stuart 2005). 
We then examine whether the underperformance of mergers in firms with invest-
ment-banker directors reverts over longer horizons. We analyze buy-and-hold returns 
over +/–36 months around each acquisition, compounded monthly over the relevant in-
                                                 
38 We use α = 0 and β = 1 since the market beta is likely close to 1 for our sample firms and because of the 
short window. The assumption eliminates biases in the returns estimation due to noise in the joint estima-
tion of alphas and betas. However, the market-model results with estimated alphas and betas are similar.   26  
terval. In Figure 3, we display the buy-and-hold returns from month 0 to month x up to 
x = 36. And, for months -36 to 0, we display the buy-and-hold returns from month –x to 
0, downward shifted so that the cumulative return as of month 0 is 0. 
The left graph in Figure 3 shows monthly raw returns, compounded for each 
merger event and then averaged in the subsamples with and without investment bankers. 
Acquirers without investment bankers display similar or better performance in the three 
years prior to the merger and their performance trend continues smoothly post merger. 
Acquirers with investment bankers, instead, perform worse post merger, both relative to 
their own prior performance and relative to acquirers without investment-banker direc-
tors. The difference in abnormal returns is even more striking. In the right panel, we sub-
tract market returns (CRSP value-weighted index) off the monthly raw returns before 
compounding. Firms without investment bankers again display a smooth trend of per-
formance both prior to and post merger. Firms with investment bankers, instead, revert 
from positive to negative abnormal returns after the merger. We find the same results us-
ing alternative models of abnormal returns (e.g., subtracting full-sample industry-mean 
returns or industry-mean returns and the firm-specific pre-event average difference be-
tween firm and industry-mean returns). We also confirm in a regression framework, in-
cluding firm and merger characteristics, that the negative announcement returns are not 
reversed over longer horizons. 
As in any long-run event study, our results may be explained by the event or by 
the (mis-)specification of expected returns. This concern is ameliorated in our context 
since we observe the same pattern – a kink at the merger month for firms with investment 
bankers, but none for firms without – using several different expected return assumptions 
and in the raw returns, i.e. without any (potentially biased) expected return adjustment.  
We conclude that investment bank directors are associated with worse invest-
ments in outside targets. 
B. Size and Cost of Public Debt Issues 
Mirroring our analysis of internal investment, we turn from acquisitions to financing 
choices. Given investment bankers’ expertise, we focus on public debt issues.
39 
We obtain contractual data on public debt issues from SDC. The summary statis-
                                                 
39 We also analyzed equity issues, but, given the small sample, did not find significant results.   27  
tics are in Table 8. The sample includes 202 debt issuances underwritten by a director’s 
investment bank, 765 issues where none of the directors’ banks are involved, and 3,147 
deals without investment bankers on the board. As with loans, affiliated deals tend to be 
larger ($176.47m) than unaffiliated issues ($114.33m) and issues of firms without banker 
directors ($100.76m), significantly so when measured as percentage of firm value (for af-
filiated versus unaffiliated, p = 0.06). The average cost of borrowing, measured as gross 
spread (underwriter fees as a percentage of the principal), is lowest for unaffiliated deals. 
The difference in the spread relative to affiliated issues is significant at the 1%-level. 
In Table 9, we test whether the board presence of financial experts affects the size 
and pricing of debt issues, controlling for the full set of firm and board characteristics as 
well as for borrower and deal characteristics from the previous empirical literature.
40 
In Columns I and II, we document the size results. The presence of an investment 
banker is associated with a $20.1m larger deal, marginally significant at the 10% level. 
The magnitude is economically significant: it is equal to 19% of the average principal in 
the sample. As in our analysis of bank lending, the estimates are larger for affiliated than 
for unaffiliated deals, but the difference lacks statistical significance (p = 0.16): the coef-
ficient estimate on Affiliated IBANKER is $64.8m (p = 0.09), compared with only $4.7m 
(p = 0.72) for Unaffiliated IBANKER.
41 In unreported estimations, we also find that in-
vestment bankers are associated with more frequent outside financing. Thus, as in the 
commercial banker setting, the larger issues are associated with more capital inside the 
firm, though the effects are not estimated precisely. 
In Column III, we analyze the pricing of public debt. We observe an insignificant 
and small negative effect of affiliated investment bankers on gross spread and a signifi-
cantly negative effect of much larger magnitude for unaffiliated investment bankers.  The 
coefficient estimate is −0.063 (p = 0.02, different from the affiliated coefficient at the 
10% level), which corresponds roughly to 11% of the sample mean of gross spread. Thus, 
firms with investment bankers on the board enjoy reduced costs of public borrowing, but 
only when the director’s bank is not involved in the deal.  
Overall, the impact of investment bankers on public debt issues mirrors that of 
                                                 
40 E.g., Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1999). See the Appendix for further details on these variables. 
41 The result is robust to scaling debt size by total market value. The size and price results are not robust to 
including firm effects.   28  
commercial bankers on loans, though the effects are estimated less precisely. Investment 
bankers are associated with larger issues, especially if their bank is an underwriter. They 
are able to lower underwriting fees – possibly due to their negotiation skills and industry 
networks – but do so only when it does not affect deals of their own banks. 
IV. Financial Expertise in the Absence of Conflicts of Interests 
Our analysis has shown that financial experts affect corporate decisions from which their 
financial institutions can benefit. Financial experts without such incentives do not exert 
any systematic influence. As the last step in our analysis, we turn to a corporate decision 
for which the interests of financial institutions and shareholders do not conflict, but fi-
nancial expertise is still valuable: the design of executive compensation.  
The common rationale for stock-based compensation is to align CEO and share-
holder interests. It is, however, debated whether the explosion of option compensation in 
the 1990s was the solution to or the result of such agency problems. One view is that it 
reflects changing CEO incentives over the last two decades (Gabaix and Landier, 2006). 
An alternative view is that the emergence of stock options allowed CEOs to extract addi-
tional rents since options are less transparent than cash (e.g., they did not need to be ex-
pensed in annual reports) and therefore less likely to violate the shareholders’ “outrage 
constraint” (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). From both perspectives, more financial literacy of 
directors is desirable – either to implement option compensation or to prevent abuses.  
In Table 10, we test whether financial experts on corporate boards affect CEO 
compensation. For this analysis, we supplement the 1988-1994 Hall and Liebman data 
with ExecuComp data from 1995-2003. We include an indicator variable for the Execu-
Comp sample years to control for differences in the valuation of CEO option grants.  
First, we ask whether the initiation and size of option compensation is related to 
the arrival of financial experts on the board. Size is calculated as the natural logarithm of 
one plus the Black-Scholes value. We include a standard set of controls (current and 
lagged stock returns, CEO Age and its square, CEO Tenure and its square, Firm Size, 
Board Size, Board Independence, and year fixed effects) and firm fixed effects. We find 
that Finance Professors exert a marginally significant positive effect (p-value = 0.06) on 
initiation (Column I) and an insignificantly positive effect (p-value = 0.16) on grant size 
(Column II). No other type of financial expert exerts a significant effect. In an alternative   29  
specification, using the number of financial experts of each type instead of dummies, the 
impact of Finance Professors becomes significant both for initiation (p=0.02) and grant 
size (p=0.06), while the effects of all other types of financial experts remain insignificant. 
Second, we ask whether financial expertise affects pay-to-performance sensitivity. 
We relate changes in the natural logarithms of one plus total compensation (Column III) 
and one plus cash compensation (Columns IV) to current and lagged stock performance, 
following Hall and Liebman (1998).
42 We find that finance professors are associated with 
lower sensitivity. For bankers and other finance experts, we do not find significant effects 
other than one negative coefficient for investment bankers.  
Perhaps surprisingly, finance professors appear to simultaneously increase the 
size of option grants and to reduce or not affect pay-performance sensitivity. Since the 
value consequences of pay-performance sensitivity are difficult to assess, the estimated 
effects are consistent with (at least) two interpretations. One interpretation is that in-
creased option grants improve incentives and our pay-performance model does not detect 
the improvement since it neglects the effect of stock price changes on CEO stock and op-
tion holdings. Another possibility is that finance professors facilitate additional stock op-
tion grants, and perhaps unintentionally, foster CEO rent extraction. 
Overall, there is little evidence that financial expertise on the board matters at all 
for compensation policies. Without strong incentives (as in the case of loans for commer-
cial bankers and in the case of security issuances for investment bankers), financial ex-
perts appear to exert little detectable influence on firm policies.  
V. Conclusion 
This paper tests whether directors with financial expertise exert significant influence on 
corporate decisions and, if so, whether they serve shareholders’ interests. We employ a 
novel long-term panel dataset, which allows us to move beyond the cross-sectional analy-
sis prevalent in previous literature. We find that finance experts significantly affect the 
finance and investment policies of firms on whose board they serve. Commercial bankers 
                                                 
42 We splice cash compensation from ExecuComp (TCC) with the sum of salary and bonus from Hall and 
Liebman. We splice total compensation from ExecuComp (TDC1) with the sum of salary, bonus, other 
compensation, restricted stock grants and the Black-Scholes value of options grants from Hall-Liebman. 
Ideally, we would also measure how changes in performance affect CEO wealth (including existing stock 
and option holdings). Unfortunately, Execucomp does not provide data on individual option packages.   30  
reduce the sensitivity of investment to cash flow by extending large loans, particularly 
through the director’s bank. However, firms that are financially constrained do not bene-
fit from the additional financing. Banker directors increase financing only to firms with 
good credit and minimal financial constraints, but poor investment opportunities. These 
results suggest that banker-directors act in the interests of creditors. Investment bankers 
are associated with larger debt issues, but also with worse acquisitions. Searching for a 
silver lining, we test whether financial experts improve policies when their interests are 
not in conflict with those of shareholders. In the context of executive option grants and 
pay-to-performance sensitivity, we find little evidence to support this hypothesis.  
Our findings suggest that the recent quest for increased financial expertise on 
boards should be implemented with caution. The impact of board members on firm poli-
cies goes beyond mere monitoring, and is affected by director interests that conflict with 
those of shareholders. While the overall impact of financial experts on shareholder value 
is difficult to assess, specific policies – like financing, investment, and compensation – do 
not seem to improve when financial experts join the board of directors. Firms and policy 
makers must trade off potential improvements in monitoring against potential losses 
through the advisory channel.   31  
Appendix: Data on Loan and Debt Contracts 
 
  




The amount that the borrower pays the lender each year for each dollar borrowed in 
the case of a term loan, and for each dollar drawn off a credit line in the case of a 
loan commitment. The drawn all-in spread equals the coupon spread plus the annual 
fee. Most spreads are measured as a markup over LIBOR. In cases where they are 
based on another benchmark, LPC makes adjustments to the drawn all-in spreads, 
by assuming the following rates: Prime = +255 bps, Cost of funds = 0 bps, Com-
mercial paper = 3 bps, T-bills = −34bps, Fed funds = 0 bps, Money market rate = 0 
bps, Banker’s acceptance = −18 bps, CDS = −6 bps (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001b). 
Maturity  Natural logarithm of the number of days between the loan origination and the ma-
turity. 
Deal or Tranche  Loan value in U.S. dollars. A deal may include several loan facilities at the same 
time. The most typical arrangement is a loan agreement that comprises a term loan 
and a revolver credit line. 
Senior  Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan is senior. 
Secured  Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the loan is secured. Since this variable is often 
missing (for about one-third of the sample), a dummy for missing cases is also in-
cluded in all regressions (not shown).  
Year  Dummy variables for the calendar years in which a loan agreement is signed. 
Loan Style  Dummy variables for “Revolver”, “Limited Line”, “Bridge Loan”, “Demand Loan”, 
“364-day facility” and “Other.” The omitted case is “Term Loan.” 
Loan Purpose  Dummy variables for “Acquisition line”, “CP backup”, “Debt repay”, “Debtor-in-
possession financing”, “ESOP”, “LBO/MBO”, “Project finance”, “Real estate”, 
“Recapitalization”, “Securities purchase”, “Spin-off”, “Stock buyback”, “Takeover” 
and “Working capital.” The omitted case is “Corp. purposes.”  
 
Public Debt Variables (Source: SDC) 
  
At-issue yield   Yield-to-maturity in basis points as a spread over the relevant treasury benchmark. 
Gross spread  Underwriter fees as a percentage of the principal issued. 
Maturity  The number of days between the loan origination and the maturity 
Principal  Issue size in U.S. dollars.  
OTC  Indicates whether the issue is listed over the counter. 
Indicators included in estimations but not shown in tables: 
CALL dummies  Indicators for each of the call covenant descriptions given by SDC: “Non-call life,” 
“Non-callable,” “Non-call/refund,” “Non-refundable,” “Make whole call.” 
PUT  Indicates whether the SDC gives a description of the put covenant. 
SINK  Indicates whether the issue involves a sinking-funds provision. 
FLOAT  Indicates whether the coupon rate is not fixed.
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32,943 0.267 0 0.442
32,943 0.030 0 0.172
32,943 0.021 0 0.144
32,943 0.004 0 0.060
32,943 0.030 0 0.171
32,943 0.017 0 0.129
32,943 0.080 0 0.271
32,943 0.023 0 0.150
32,943 0.010 0 0.100
32,943 0.005 0 0.073
32,943 0.017 0 0.129
32,943 0.043 0 0.204
32,943 0.028 0 0.165
32,943 0.441 0 0.497
32,943 0.103 0 0.304
32,923 59.581 60 8.004
32,682 9.063 7 8.132
32,943 0.085 0 0.280
32,938 2.008 2 2.090
2910 8185.72 3388.94 18978.52
2910 3405.63 1478.30 6074.26
2910 586.92 201.45 1760.71
2910 735.99 292.29 1566.99
2910 0.21 0.17 0.16
2910 0.35 0.25 0.37
2910 1.74 1.32 1.30
2868 0.08 0.08 0.06
2888 0.13 0.11 0.27
2705 2.05 1.93 1.14
2906 0.43 0.45 0.22
2896 0.23 0.21 0.16
2910 11.32 11 2.64
2910 0.73 0.75 0.14
2910 0.27 0 0.44
2910 0.06 0 0.24
2910 0.21 0 0.40
2910 0.16 0 0.37
2910 0.46 0 0.50
2910 0.23 0 0.42
2910 0.56 1 0.50
2910 0.18 0 0.38
Industry Mean Industry Mean Industry Mean Industry Mean
Food 0.06 Durables 0.03 Steel 0.02 Transport 0.06
Mining 0.01 Chemicals 0.05 Fab. Prod. 0.01 Utilities 0.15
Oil 0.03 Consumer 0.06 Machine 0.09 Retail 0.07
Textiles 0.02 Construction 0.04 Cars 0.04 Other 0.26
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Panel C. Fama-French 17 Industry Groups (Finance Industry Excluded)
Finance Executive (CFO, Accountant, Treasurer, VP of Finance) 
CFO
Panel A. Director Summary Statistics (Number of Directors = 5,378)
Panel  B. Firm Summary Statistics (Number of Firms = 282)
Accountant
Finance Professor (includes economics, accounting, business)
Lawyer
Consultant
Number of Other Directorships
Other industry career







Financial Executives & Accountants (dummy)
Executives of Non-bank Financial Companies (dummy)
Finance Professors (dummy)
Outside Financial Executives & Accountants (dummy)
Unaffiliated
The sample period is 1988-2001. Panel A provides summary statistics for director-years. All variables other than Age, Tenure and Number of Other
Directorships are dummy variables indicating the director's career. Panels B and C describe firm-years. Firm characteristics are from Compustat Annual (item 
numbers in parentheses): Assets are total assets (6), Capital is property, plant, and equipment (8), Investment is capital expenditures (128), Cash Flow is
earnings before extraordinary items (18) plus depreciation (14). Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets over total assets (6), where market value is total assets
plus market equity (25*199) minus book equity (6-181-10+35+79). Return on Assets (ROA) is income (18+15+50+51) divided by the average of current and
lagged total assets. Return on Equity (ROE) is net income (172) scaled by the average of current and lagged book equity. Altman’s z-score is defined as 3.3
times the difference in operating income before depreciation (13) and depreciation and amortization (14) plus sales (12) plus 1.4 times retained earnings (36)
plus 1.2 times working capital (121), divided by total assets (6). Book Leverage is interest bearing debt (9+34) divided by operating assets (9+34+216).
Market Leverage is interest bearing debt divided by the market value of assets. Board Size is the number of directors. Board Independence is the ratio of
outside directors over board size. COMBANKER, IBANKER, (Outside) Financial Executives & Accountants, Executives of Non-bank Financial Companies,
and Finance Professors in Panel B are dummy variables indicating if at least one director has the corresponding career. In Panel C, industry dummies are








Executive of Non-Bank Financial Company
Insider 







Investment / lagged capital




Market Leverage(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Cash Flow 0.461 0.389 0.382 0.608
[2.13]** [1.70]* [1.43] [1.85]*
(COMBANKER)*(Cash Flow) -0.116 -0.085 -0.066
[3.66]*** [2.47]** [1.66]*
(IBANKER)*(Cash Flow) -0.03 -0.086 0.002
[0.69] [1.54] [0.04]
(Executives of Non-bank Financial Cos)*(Cash Flow) -0.012 -0.066 -0.025
[0.40] [1.43] [0.93]
(Financial Executives & Accountants)*(Cash Flow) 0.007 0.034 0.012
[0.22] [1.19] [0.40]
(Finance Professors)*(Cash Flow) -0.001 -0.068 -0.075
[0.03] [1.23] [1.55]
COMBANKER 0.017 0.035 0.034
[1.61] [2.82]*** [2.62]***
IBANKER 0.026 0.021 -0.011
[1.49] [1.13] [0.54]
Executives of Non-bank Financial Companies 0.001 0.020 0.011
[0.17] [1.49] [1.13]
Financial Executives & Accountants 0.008 -0.001 0.010
[0.89] [0.05] [0.94]
Finance Professors 0.007 0.016 0.009
[0.44] [0.75] [0.46]
Q 0.024 0.029 0.032 0.027
[2.18]** [2.48]** [2.95]*** [2.66]***
(Q)*(Cash Flow) 0.011 0.002 -0.001 -0.007
[1.24] [0.23] [0.10] [0.70]
Firm Size 0.003 0.005 -0.027 0.008
[0.55] [0.80] [2.16]** [0.58]
(Firm Size)*(Cash Flow) -0.017 -0.020 -0.075 -0.130
[0.68] [0.85] [2.87]*** [3.98]***
Board Size 0.034 0.021 -0.039 -0.041
[1.58] [0.98] [0.95] [1.42]
(Board Size)*(Cash Flow) -0.065 -0.008 0.087 0.054
[0.73] [0.10] [0.73] [0.63]
Board Independence -0.093 -0.096 -0.115 -0.034
[1.84]* [2.02]** [1.88]* [0.61]
(Board Independence)*(Cash Flow) 0.141 0.206 0.524 0.229
[0.92] [1.37] [2.76]*** [1.67]*
Industry Fixed Effects yes yes no no
(Industry Fixed Effects)*(Cash Flow) yes yes yes no
Firm Fixed Effects no no yes yes
(Firm Fixed Effects)*(Cash Flow) no no no yes
Observations 2910 2910 2910 2910
R-squared 0.48 0.49 0.69 0.80
Robust t-statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2. Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow: Baseline Regressions
COMBANKER is an indicator variable for the presence of a commercial banker on the board; IBANKER indicates an investment banker.
Likewise, Executives of Non-bank Financial Companies, Financial Executives & Accountants, and Finance Professors are dummy variables
indicating the presence of such a director on the board. All regressions include year fixed effects and their interactions with Cash Flow. All
regressions also include S&P credit rating fixed effects (defined using the S&P long term debt rating) and their interactions with Cash Flow.
Industry indicators are coded according to the 48 Fama-French industry groups. All standard errors are clustered by firm.
OLS regressions with Investment as the dependent variable, defined as capital expenditures normalized by lagged capital. Cash Flow is
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, normalized by lagged capital. Q is the (lagged) ratio of market value of assets to book
value of assets. Firm Size is the natural logarithmof lagged book assets. Board Size is the natural logarithmof the number of directors on the
board. Board Independence is the ratio of the number of outside directors to board size. Figure 1. Board Size over the Sample Period


















Median(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Baseline 2SLS
Dependent Variable Investment COMBANKER (COMBANKER)*(CF) Investment
Cash Flow 0.480 0.355 -0.327 0.256
[2.27]** [0.95] [1.35] [0.94]








Q 0.028 0.025 0.030 0.043
[2.52]** [1.29] [2.40]** [2.50]**
(Q)*(Cash Flow) 0.001 -0.040 -0.056 -0.028
[0.14] [2.64]*** [2.70]*** [1.08]
Firm Size 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.011
[0.65] [0.06] [1.36] [1.04]
(Firm Size)*(Cash Flow) -0.018 -0.003 -0.030 -0.033
[0.79] [0.06] [0.83] [1.09]
Board Size 0.031 0.378 0.001 -0.031
[1.59] [3.68]*** [0.02] [0.45]
(Board Size)*(Cash Flow) -0.028 -0.127 0.282 0.182
[0.38] [0.88] [2.33]** [1.20]
Board Independence -0.095 0.304 0.006 -0.153
[1.97]** [2.11]** [0.12] [1.97]*
(Board Independence)*(Cash Flow) 0.158 -0.089 0.253 0.361
[1.10] [0.38] [1.36] [1.97]*
Board Tenure 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[1.86]* [2.09]** [1.46] [1.83]*
(Board Tenure)*(Cash Flow) -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004
[1.90]* [2.21]** [1.53] [1.88]*
Observations 2907 2907 2907 2907
R-squared 0.49 0.23 0.41 0.36
Table 3. Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow: Instrumental Variable Estimation
First Stage
Robust t-statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Investment is capital expenditures normalized by lagged capital. Cash Flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, normalized by lagged capital. Q is the
(lagged) ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of lagged book assets. Board Size is the natural logarithm of the number of
directors on the board. Board Independence is the ratio of the number of outside directors to board size. Board Tenure is the mean tenure of directors on the board.
#COMBANKER is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of commercial bankers on the board. CRISIS is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of directors who
joined the board between 1976 and 1985. ColumnI shows the baseline OLS regresssion; ColumnsII and III the first-stage OLS regressions, usingCRISIS and its interactionwith
Cash Flow to instrument for Commercial Bankers and its interaction with Cash Flow; the second stage is in Column IV.
All regressions include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and their interactions with Cash Flow. All regressions also include S&P credit rating fixed effects (using the S&P
long term debt rating categories) and their interactions with Cash Flow. Industry indicators are coded according to the 48 Fama-French industry groups. All standard errors are
clustered by firm.(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
Cash Flow 0.675 0.811 0.414 0.772
[0.53] [2.05]** [0.30] [1.94]*
(COMBANKER)*(Cash Flow) 0.150 -0.090
[1.30] [2.24]**
(Affiliated COMBANKER)*(Cash Flow) 0.200 -0.378
[1.30] [2.54]**
(Unaffiliated COMBANKER)*(Cash Flow) 0.137 -0.081
[1.08] [1.94]*
(IBANKER)*(Cash Flow) 0.058 0.016 0.058 0.022
[0.35] [0.24] [0.35] [0.33]
(Execs of Non-bank Fin Cos)*(Cash Flow) 0.050 -0.011 0.049 -0.011
[0.61] [0.34] [0.59] [0.33]
(Fin Execs & Accountants)*(Cash Flow) 0.001 0.03 -0.002 0.029
[0.01] [0.71] [0.02] [0.67]
(Finance Professors)*(Cash Flow) 0.231 -0.114 0.229 -0.119
[1.37] [1.81]* [1.35] [1.91]*
COMBANKER -0.016 0.055
[0.80] [2.36]**
Affiliated COMBANKER -0.027 0.139
[1.14] [3.23]***
Unaffiliated COMBANKER -0.013 0.055
[0.63] [2.22]**
IBANKER -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008
[0.18] [0.09] [0.19] [0.26]
Executives of Non-bank Financial Companies -0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.006
[0.27] [0.28] [0.26] [0.29]
Financial Executives & Accountants 0.01 -0.007 0.011 -0.009
[0.56] [0.33] [0.58] [0.43]
Finance Professors -0.049 0.046 -0.049 0.049
[1.93]* [1.29] [1.90]* [1.35]
Q 0.060 0.008 0.060 0.009
[2.33]** [0.56] [2.31]** [0.64]
(Q)*(Cash Flow) -0.034 -0.001 -0.034 -0.001
[0.88] [0.04] [0.87] [0.09]
Firm Size 0.015 0.021 0.015 0.020
[0.49] [0.90] [0.48] [0.86]
(Firm Size)*(Cash Flow) -0.228 -0.114 -0.227 -0.112
[1.93]* [3.36]*** [1.92]* [3.21]***
Board Size 0.078 -0.034 0.080 -0.027
[1.26] [0.48] [1.28] [0.41]
(Board Size)*(Cash Flow) -0.475 0.002 -0.483 0.007
[1.29] [0.02] [1.30] [0.06]
Board Independence -0.087 -0.082 -0.087 -0.074
[0.93] [0.79] [0.93] [0.73]
(Board Independence)*(Cash Flow) 0.723 0.075 0.726 0.065
[1.95]* [0.43] [1.93]* [0.38]
Observations 1350 1364 1350 1364
R-squared 0.89 0.84 0.89 0.84
Table 4. Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow: Split-Sample Results
Robust t-statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
OLS regressions with Investment as dependent variable, defined as capital expenditures normalized by lagged capital. Constrained (unconstrained)firms are those with lagged
Kaplan-Zingales index values above (below) the sample median. Cash Flow is earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation, normalized by lagged capital. Q is the
(lagged) ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Firm Size is the natural logarithmof lagged book assets. Board Size is the natural logarithmof the number of
directors on the board. Board Independence is the ratio of the number of outside directors to board size. 
COMBANKER is an indicator variable for the presence of a commercial banker on the board; IBANKER indicates an investmentbanker. Likewise, Executives of Non-bank
Financial Companies, Financial Executives & Accountants, and Finance Professors indicate the presence of such a director on the board. Affiliated COMBANKER indicates
the presence of a commercial banker whose bank has a prior lending relationship with the firm. Unaffiliated COMBANKER indicates that commercial banker directors are
present, but none have lending relationships. All regressions include firm and year fixed effects and their interactions with Cash Flow. All regressions also include S&P credit
rating fixed effects (using the S&P long term debt rating categories), and their interactions with Cash Flow. All standard errors are clustered by firm.p-value p-value
Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev (A - U) Obs Mean Std Dev (A - N)
Firm Variables
Assets ($M) 1288 8724.82 17515.22 89 14602.66 32802.22 223 10490.25 22940.14 0.24 976 7785.46 13537.57 0.14
Q 1288 1.61 1.15 89 1.46 0.59 223 1.49 1.13 0.85 976 1.65 1.19 0.15
PPE over Assets 1288 0.42 0.22 89 0.54 0.23 223 0.52 0.24 0.77 976 0.39 0.20 0.00
Stock Volatility 1288 0.08 0.04 89 0.07 0.03 223 0.07 0.03 0.75 976 0.09 0.04 0.03
Book Leverage 1288 0.49 0.19 89 0.47 0.20 223 0.51 0.19 0.29 976 0.49 0.19 0.68
Market Leverage 1288 0.26 0.17 89 0.24 0.13 223 0.29 0.17 0.16 976 0.26 0.17 0.55
Board Size 1288 11.20 2.57 89 12.19 2.47 223 11.52 2.34 0.19 976 11.04 2.61 0.03
Board Independence 1288 0.73 0.14 89 0.77 0.09 223 0.76 0.12 0.38 976 0.72 0.14 0.01
COMBANKER 1288 0.24 0.43 89 1 0 223 1 0 n.a. 976 0 0 n.a.
Affiliated 1288 0.07 0.25 89 1 0 223 0 0 n.a. 976 0 0 n.a.
Unaffiliated 1288 0.17 0.38 89 0 0 223 1 0 n.a. 976 0 0 n.a.
Affiliated Lead 1288 0.04 0.19 89 0.52 0.50 223 0 0 n.a. 976 0 0 n.a.
IBANKER 1288 0.21 0.41 89 0.20 0.40 223 0.11 0.32 0.17 976 0.23 0.42 0.71
Fin Execs & Accountants 1288 0.45 0.50 89 0.42 0.50 223 0.39 0.49 0.75 976 0.47 0.50 0.52
Accountants 1288 0.12 0.33 89 0.01 0.11 223 0.07 0.25 0.09 976 0.14 0.35 0.00
CFOs 1288 0.32 0.47 89 0.31 0.47 223 0.29 0.45 0.73 976 0.33 0.47 0.82
Outside Fin Execs & Accountants 1288 0.23 0.42 89 0.22 0.42 223 0.21 0.41 0.80 976 0.24 0.43 0.82
Outside Accountants 1288 0.06 0.24 89 0 0 223 0.05 0.22 0.14 976 0.07 0.26 0.00
Outside CFOs 1288 0.12 0.33 89 0.16 0.37 223 0.10 0.30 0.34 976 0.13 0.33 0.59
Execs of Non-bank Fin Cos 1288 0.56 0.50 89 0.49 0.50 223 0.55 0.50 0.52 976 0.57 0.49 0.40
Finance Professors 1288 0.14 0.34 89 0.13 0.34 223 0.12 0.33 0.87 976 0.14 0.35 0.94
Loan Variables
Tranche ($M) 1288 644.24 1254.56 89 1408.93 2993.20 223 649.42 1588.62 0.03 976 573.33 797.43 0.03
Tranche / Market Value of Firm 1288 0.08 0.10 89 0.11 0.12 223 0.07 0.10 0.08 976 0.08 0.10 0.20
Drawn Spread (basis points) 1024 81.94 85.42 78 57.79 57.56 155 80.38 88.59 0.15 791 84.62 86.77 0.05
Un-drawn Spread (basis points) 817 18.24 14.26 69 15.30 12.12 126 18.72 14.70 0.15 622 18.47 14.37 0.15
Maturity 1108 3.54 2.58 85 3.68 2.28 185 3.77 3.58 0.86 838 3.47 2.34 0.47
Credit Line 1288 0.60 0.49 89 0.63 0.49 223 0.57 0.50 0.40 976 0.61 0.49 0.69
Syndicated 1288 0.85 0.36 89 0.94 0.23 223 0.81 0.40 0.02 976 0.85 0.36 0.02
Number of Lenders 1288 12.33 12.84 89 19.35 17.10 223 8.46 9.22 0.00 976 12.58 12.80 0.03
Senior 1288 0.87 0.34 89 0.84 0.37 223 0.83 0.38 0.76 976 0.88 0.32 0.47
Secured 1288 0.13 0.34 89 0.13 0.34 223 0.10 0.30 0.62 976 0.14 0.35 0.94
Table 5. Summary Statistics: Bank Loans
Stock volatility is 12-month trailing standard deviation of CRSP monthly returns. Other firm variables are total book assets, Tobin's Q, plant, property, and equipment over assets, book leverage and market leverage, all defined using Compustat annual items.
Board size is the number of directors, Board independence is the number of outside directors scaled by the number of directors. COMBANKER, IBANKER, (Outside) FinancialExecs & Accountants, Execs of Non-bank Fin. Companies, and Finance Professors
are dummyvariables that indicate the board presence of at least one director with the corresponding career. Affiliatedindicates that a commercial-bankerdirector's bank is among the originators of the loan. AffiliatedLead indicates that the director's bank is the
lead lender. Unaffiliatedindicates that a commercialbanker is present on the board, but his/her bank is not involvedin the loan. p-value (A-U) gives the p-value of a t-test that the differencesin means between the AffiliatedCombanker subsample and Unaffiliated
Combanker subsample is 0. Standard errors for this test are clustered at the firm level.  Likewise, p-value (A-N) tests the differences between the Affiliated Combanker and No Combanker subsamples.
All Loan Variables are fromLPC Dealscan. Tranche is loan size (in $M). Drawn Spread is the annualfee per dollar that the borrower pays the lender for a term loan. Un-drawn Spread is the annualfee per dollar to keep the credit line active. Both rates are quoted
in basis points as a spread over a bench-marksuch as LIBOR. Maturity is the number of years between signingof the loan contract and maturity.Credit Line is a dummythat indicates whether the tranche is a credit line. A typical deal involvesa term loan (active
immediately)and a credit line that gives the borrower the option to obtain loans at predetermined contract terms. Syndicated is a dummythat indicates whether the loan comes from a syndicate of banks. Number of Lenders denotes the numberof banks involved.
Senior indicates that the debt has a priority over other debt obligations of the company. Secured indicates that the deal involves a lien on borrower assets (e.g., assets, guarantees, or other collateral).
Full Sample Affiliated Commercial Banker Unaffiliated Commercial Banker No Commercial Banker(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Full Sample Full Sample Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained
COMBANKER 346.729
[1.86]*
Affiliated COMBANKER 458.393 213.364 910.576 47.226 1,464.07
[2.18]** [1.86]* [2.25]** [0.38] [2.14]**
Unaffiliated COMBANKER 295.692 121.316 500.442 -17.887 1,341.58
[1.57] [1.78]* [1.35] [0.20] [1.29]
IBANKER 203.157 200.727 73.851 365.428 119.679 886.125
[1.17] [1.16] [1.03] [1.51] [1.17] [1.81]*
Executives of Non-bank Financial Cos -17.069 -13.146 -106.732 -6.420 -0.991 -71.075
[0.35] [0.27] [1.68]* [0.07] [0.01] [0.24]
Financial Executives & Accountants 23.054 21.396 112.679 214.156 264.817 402.142
[0.36] [0.34] [1.51] [1.03] [2.29]** [1.53]
Finance Professors -28.430 -27.157 -102.41 206.814 22.525 -264.967
[0.32] [0.31] [1.53] [0.84] [0.18] [0.79]
Controls for firm characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for board characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for deal characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes no no
Firm Fixed Effects no no no no yes yes
Observations 1288 1288 658 493 658 493
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.61 0.51 0.70 0.60
Table 6. Loan Size Regressions
Robust t-statistics in brackets.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
OLS regressions with Loan Size (Tranche) in $ millionsas the dependent variable. Firms are constrained (unconstrained) when their lagged Kaplan-Zingalesindex is above (below) the full
sample median.COMBANKERis an indicator variable for the presence of a commercialbanker on the board; IBANKER indicates an investmentbanker. Executivesof Non-bank Financial
Companies, FinancialExecutives & Accountants, and Finance Professors are dummy variables indicating the presence of such a director on the board. AffiliatedCOMBANKER indicates
that a commercial-bankerdirector’s bank is among the originators of the loan. Unaffiliated COMBANKER indicates that commercial bankers are present on the board, but their banks are
not involvedin the loan. Controls for firmcharacteristics are Q (market value of assets over the book value of assets), FirmSize (natural logarithmof total book assets), PPE/Assets (plants,
property and equipmentscaled by assets), Leverage (long term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by long term debt plus debt in current liabilitiesplus stockholders' equity), Stock
Volatility (measured over the 12 months preceding the loan initiation), and S&P credit rating fixed effects, using the S&P long-term debt rating-categories. 
Controls for board characteristics are Board Size (natural logarithmof number of directors on the board) and Board Independence (ratio of outside directors to board size). Controls for deal
characteristics are Maturity (natural logarithmof the days to maturity), Senior (dummyindicatingthat the debt has a priority over other debt obligations of the company), Secured (dummy
indicatingthat the deal involves a lien on borrower assets, guarantees, or other collateral), Number of Lenders (numberof banks involved), Syndicated (dummyindicatingwhether the loan
comes from a syndicate of banks) and indicators for loan style, loan purpose, and missingobservations for the maturityand secured variables. Industry indicators are coded according to the
48 Fama-French industry groups. All standard errors are clustered by firm.The first six panels depict the sample means of ROA, ROE, and Q net of the full sample industry median. Industry is measured using the 48 Fama and French industry groups. If
there are less than 5 sample firmsin a category, the Fama-French17 group is used; if there are less than 5 sample firmsin this group, the Fama-French12 group is used. The last two
panels depicts unadjusted sample-mean Altman's Z-scores. ROA is income before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus deferred taxes (when available) plus income tax
credit (when available), divided by the average of current and lagged book assets. ROE is net income divided by the average of current and lagged book equity. Z-score is 3.3 times
the difference in operating income before depreciation and depreciation and amortization plus sales plus 1.4 times retained earnings plus 1.2 times working capital, divided by book
assets. Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Constrained (unconstrained)firms are those with lagged Kaplan-Zingalesindex values above (below) the
full sample median. Year 0 indicates the fiscal year in which the firm has obtained at least one bank loan.
Affiliatedindicates that a commercial banker is present on the board at the time of the loan and that the director’s bank is among the loan's originators. Unaffiliatedindicates that a
commercial banker is present on the board, but his/her bank is not involved in the loan. No banker indicates that no commercial banker sits on the board at the time of the loan.
Figure 2.  Firm Performance Conditional on Bank Borrowing
































































































































































































No BankerObs Mean Median Std Dev Obs Mean Median Std Dev Obs Mean Median Std Dev p-value
% owned after transaction 526 98.76 100 7.15 83 98.59 100 7.31 443 98.79 100 7.12 0.76
% of target acquired 526 96.42 100 11.65 83 96.54 100 11.59 443 96.40 100 11.68 0.90
Target Value ($M) 526 214.04 128.92 227.76 83 261.62 164 263.91 443 205.12 122 219.52 0.05
Cash Only (dummy) 526 0.63 1 0.48 83 0.59 1 0.49 443 0.63 1 0.48 0.75
Public Target (dummy) 526 0.30 0 0.46 83 0.37 0 0.49 443 0.29 0 0.45 0.08
IBANKER 526 0.16 0 0.36 83 1 1 0 443 0 0 0 n.a.
COMBANKER 526 0.26 0 0.44 83 0.34 0 0.48 443 0.25 0 0.43 0.42
Executives of Non-bank Financial Cos 526 0.65 1 0.48 83 0.64 1 0.48 443 0.65 1 0.48 0.86
Finance Executives & Accountants 526 0.33 0 0.47 83 0.23 0 0.42 443 0.35 0 0.48 0.20
Outside Finance Executives & Accountants 526 0.18 0 0.39 83 0.06 0 0.24 443 0.21 0 0.41 0.00
Finance Professors 526 0.14 0 0.35 83 0 0 0 443 0.17 0 0.38 0.00
Board Independence 526 0.72 0.73 0.12 83 0.76 0.78 0.11 443 0.72 0.73 0.12 0.21
Board Size 526 10.98 11 2.81 83 12.04 12 2.45 443 10.79 11 2.84 0.02
CAR [-2,+2] 526 -0.48% -0.51% 0.05 83 -1.33% -1.41% 0.05 443 -0.32% -0.42% 0.05 0.11
IBANKER
COMBANKER
Executives of Non-bank Financial Companie


























































Panel B. Market Reaction to Merger Bids
OLS regressions with CAR as the dependent variable. Board Size is the natural logarithmof number of directors. Cash Only (Stock Only) is equal to 1 if the acquisition is financed with cash (stock) and is 0 otherwise. Mixed financingis the
omitted category. Diversifyingis equal to 1 if the acquiror and target do not share the same 2 digit SIC code. All other variable definitionsand sample restrictions are described in Panel A. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects.


















Investment Bankers No Investment Bankers
Table 7. Acquisitions
Panel A. Summary Statistics
SDC data of completed mergers of sample firms, with > 50% target shares acquired and >$ 5 m deal value. Leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, self-tenders, subsidiary acquisitions, spin-offs, exchange offers, repurchases, minority stake
purchases, privatizations, and remaining-interestacquisitions are excluded. The Cash Only dummyis 1 if the deal payment is 100% cash. The Public Target dummy is 1 if the target is a public company. COMBANKER, IBANKER, (Outside)
FinancialExecs & Accountants, Execs of Non-bank FinancialCompanies, and Finance Professors are dummyvariables indicatingthe board presence of at least one director with the corresponding career. Board Size is the number of directors.
Board Independence is the ratio of outside directors to board size. CAR is the cumulativeabnormal return over the (-2,+2) window around the merger bids, computed as raw returns minusCRSP value-weightedindex returns. The p-values (last
column) are from t-tests that the differences in means between firms with and without investment-banker directors at the time of their merger bids is 0, with standard errors clustered at the industry level (17 Fama-French industries).
Full SampleFigure 3. Long Run Stock Performance Around Mergers
The figures show stock performance around mergers in event time. Month 0 is the month in which the firm announced a merger bid. The sample includes all completed deals with
target shares acquired > 50% and deal value > $5M. Leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, self-tenders, acquisitions of subsidiaries, spin-offs, exchange offers, repurchases, minority
stake purchases, privatizations,and acquisitionsof remaininginterests are excluded. In the legend, "ibanker" indicates that an investmentbanker is present on the board at the time of
the merger bid and "no ibanker" indicates the opposite. All returns are buy and hold, i.e. compounded monthlyover the relevant interval. For months 0 to 36, the figures display buy
and hold returns from month 0 to month x. For months -36 to 0, the figures display buy and hold returns from month -x to 0, downward shifted so that the cumulativereturn as of
month 0 is 0. In the left figure, monthly raw returns are compounded for each merger event and then averaged across events within the no ibanker and ibanker subsamples. In the

























Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev (A - U) Obs Mean Std Dev (A - N)
Firm Variables
Assets ($m) 4114 38016.56 56925.63 202 50143.42 76247.55 765 86796.97 89629.05 0.01 3147 25380.20 34153.52 0.39
Q 4114 1.43 0.73 202 1.36 0.69 765 1.33 0.57 0.74 3147 1.46 0.76 0.46
PPE over Assets 4114 0.38 0.23 202 0.32 0.17 765 0.32 0.17 0.97 3147 0.40 0.24 0.25
Stock Volatility 4114 0.08 0.03 202 0.08 0.03 765 0.07 0.02 0.03 3147 0.08 0.03 0.39
Book Leverage 4114 0.59 0.17 202 0.60 0.21 765 0.65 0.17 0.15 3147 0.58 0.17 0.76
Market Leverage 4114 0.30 0.13 202 0.32 0.17 765 0.33 0.15 0.73 3147 0.29 0.12 0.58
Board Size 4114 12.22 2.19 202 12.37 2.33 765 13.19 2.22 0.01 3147 11.97 2.10 0.53
Board Independence 4114 0.80 0.12 202 0.75 0.15 765 0.79 0.15 0.05 3147 0.81 0.11 0.26
IBANKER 4114 0.24 0.42 202 1 0 765 1 0 n.a. 3147 0 0 n.a.
Affiliated 4114 0.05 0.22 202 1 0 765 0 0 n.a. 3147 0 0 n.a.
Unaffiliated 4114 0.19 0.39 202 0 0 765 1 0 n.a. 3147 0 0 n.a.
COMBANKER 4114 0.26 0.44 202 0.27 0.44 765 0.48 0.50 0.02 3147 0.21 0.41 0.74
Execs of Non-bank Fin Cos 4114 0.52 0.50 202 0.30 0.46 765 0.34 0.47 0.72 3147 0.57 0.49 0.06
Fin Execs & Accountants 4114 0.32 0.47 202 0.50 0.50 765 0.44 0.50 0.64 3147 0.28 0.45 0.18
Outside Fin Execs & Accountants 4114 0.20 0.40 202 0.33 0.47 765 0.22 0.41 0.25 3147 0.19 0.39 0.41
Finance Professors 4114 0.12 0.32 202 0.13 0.34 765 0.05 0.23 0.47 3147 0.13 0.34 0.98
Debt Variables
Principal ($m) 4114 107.00 171.12 202 176.47 197.64 765 114.33 211.15 0.24 3147 100.76 156.84 0.18
Principal / Firm Value 4114 0.01 0.02 202 0.01 0.03 765 0.01 0.01 0.06 3147 0.01 0.02 0.41
Gross Spread 2258 0.58 0.39 125 0.59 0.38 386 0.48 0.32 0.01 1747 0.60 0.40 0.86
At-Issue Yield Spread 2194 103.21 75.87 104 116.74 64.65 354 95.20 76.41 0.05 1736 104.03 76.25 0.38
Maturity 4114 8.36 8.30 202 7.29 7.97 765 5.98 6.74 0.41 3147 9.01 8.55 0.34
OTC 4114 0.00 0.05 202 0 0 765 0.00 0.04 0.32 3147 0.00 0.06 0.17
Floating Rate 4114 0.14 0.34 202 0.15 0.36 765 0.24 0.43 0.00 3147 0.11 0.31 0.41
Puttable 4114 0.04 0.19 202 0.04 0.20 765 0.04 0.19 0.98 3147 0.04 0.19 0.96
Callable (Make Whole Call) 4114 0.07 0.25 202 0.07 0.25 765 0.03 0.17 0.16 3147 0.08 0.27 0.81
Sinking Funds 4114 0.02 0.15 202 0.01 0.10 765 0.02 0.15 0.57 3147 0.02 0.15 0.28
Table 8. Summary Statistics: Public Debt
Affiliated(Unaffiliated)IBANKER indicates that an investment-bankerdirector's bank is (not) among the underwriters of the debt. Principal is debt size in $m. At-Issue Yield Spread is the yield to maturityat issuance (spread over the relevant treasury
benchmark). Gross Spread is the underwritingfees as a percentage of the principal. Maturity is the number of years to maturity.OTC indicates whether the issue is listed over the counter. Floating Rate indicates a variable coupon rate. Puttable, Callable,
and Sinking funds indicate the presence of call, put, and sinking funds provisions in the debt contract. The p-values (A-U) are based on t-tests that the differences in means between the Affiliated IBANKER subsample and Unaffiliated IBANKER
subsample are 0; p-values (A-N) test the differences between the Affiliated IBANKER and No IBANKER subsamples. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
Full Sample No IBANKER Affiliated IBANKER Unaffiliated IBANKER
Data on public debt issues are from SDC. Stock volatility is 12-month trailing standard deviation of CRSP monthly returns. Other firm variables are total book assets, Tobin's Q, plant, property, and equipment over assets, book leverage and market
leverage, all defined using Compustat annual items. Board size is the number of directors, Board independence is the number of outside directors scaled by the number of directors. COMBANKER, IBANKER, (Outside) FinancialExecs & Accountants,
Execs of Non-bank Fin. Companies, and Finance Profs are dummy variables that indicate the board presence of at least one director with the corresponding career(I) (II) (III)







Affiliated IBANKER 64.822 -0.007
[1.69]* [0.18]
Unaffiliated IBANKER 4.720 -0.063
[0.36] [2.29]**
COMBANKER 8.869 10.524 0.041
[0.74] [0.85] [1.69]*
Executives of Non-bank Financial Companies 1.201 1.606 0.033
[0.11] [0.15] [1.63]
Financial Executives & Accountants 9.649 9.488 0.029
[0.95] [0.93] [1.55]
Finance Professors 4.548 3.645 -0.051
[0.27] [0.21] [2.08]**
Q 17.730 18.280 -0.027
[1.88]* [1.92]* [1.37]
PPE/Assets -57.395 -60.696 -0.122
[1.30] [1.39] [1.41]
Stock Volatility 291.26 256.331 1.552
[2.13]** [1.85]* [2.94]***
OTC -2.439 0.019 0.261
[0.06] [0.00] [1.73]*
Leverage -178.011 -169.661 0.087
[3.48]*** [3.16]*** [1.22]
Firm Size 53.274 53.555 -0.052
[6.08]*** [6.01]*** [4.06]***




Board Size -51.815 -51.163 -0.021
[0.97] [0.96] [0.37]
Board Independence -148.903 -145.326 0.25
[2.97]*** [2.85]*** [2.32]**
Observations 4114 4114 2258
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.45
Robust t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%
OLS regressions with dependent variables Principal (debt issued. in $m) in ColumnsI and II and Gross Spread (underwriter fees as
a percentage of the issue) in ColumnIII. Indicators for put, call, and sinkingfund covenants, and variable coupon rates are included
in all estimations, but not shown in the table. Q is the market value of assets over the book value of assets. Firm Size is the natural
logarithmof total book assets. Board Size is the natural logarithmof number of directors on the board. Board Independence is the
ratio of outside directors to board size. PPE/Assets is plants, property and equipment scaled by assets. 
Leverage is long term debt plus debt in current liabilities,divided by long term debt plus debt in current liabilitiesplus stockholders'
equity. Stock Volatility is measured over the 12 months preceding the debt issue. Maturity is the natural logarithm of the days to
maturity. COMBANKER is an indicator variable for the presence of a commercial banker on the board; IBANKER indicates an
investment banker; Executivess of Non-bank Financial Companies, Financial Executives & Accountants, and Finance Professors
are dummy variables indicating the presence of such a director on the board. Affiliated IBANKER indicates that the investment
banker director’s bank is among the underwriters of the issue. Unaffiliated IBANKER indicates that an investment banker is
present on the board, but his/her bank is not involved in the issue. All regressions include industry and year fixed effects as well as
S&P credit rating fixed effects, using the S&P long-term debt rating categories. Industry indicators are coded according to the 17
Fama-French industry groups. All standard errors are clustered by firm.
Table 9. Cost and Size of Public Debt Issues(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Dependent Variable Any Options ln(1+BSV)  ∆ln(1+Total Comp) ∆ln(1+Cash Comp)
Rt 0.022 0.486 1.224 0.136
(0.95) (2.47)** (1.50) (0.50)
Rt-1 0.005 0.073 -0.454 -0.018
(0.84) (2.73)*** (0.65) (0.07)
Finance Professors 0.081 0.432 0.026 0.116
(1.86)* (1.41) (0.27) (2.14)**
(Finance Professors)*Rt-1 -0.689 -0.380
(1.95)* (1.72)*
(Finance Professors)*Rt 0.056 -0.308
(0.31) (2.07)**
Fin Execs & Accountants -0.010 -0.064 0.054 -0.033
(0.45) (0.42) (0.76) (0.99)
(Fin Execs & Accountants)*Rt-1 -0.078 0.016
(0.49) (0.20)
(Fin Execs & Accountants)*Rt 0.110 -0.033
(0.61) (0.44)
COMBANKER 0.034 0.199 0.035 0.033





IBANKER 0.029 0.12 -0.061 0.049





Execs of Non-bank Fin Cos 0.038 0.25 0.006 0.004
(1.44) (1.44) (0.09) (0.21)
(Execs of Non-bank Fin Cos)*Rt-1 -0.383 0.028
(1.58) (0.36)
(Execs of Non-bank Fin Cos)*Rt 0.109 0.017
(0.73) (0.25)
Additional Controls (see Caption) yes yes yes yes
Observations 2909 2909 2471 2487
R-squared 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.14
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Constant included. T-statistics (in parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-corrected and clustered by firm.
OLS regressions with the following dependent variable: an indicator equal to 1 if the CEO receives any option grant in Column I; the natural logarithm of one plus
the Black-Scholesvalue of option grants in ColumnII; the change in the natural logarithmof one plus total compensationin ColumnIII; and the change in the natural
logarithm of one plus cash compensation in Column IV. Compensation data is from the Hall-Liebman(1998) for 1988 to 1994 and from ExecuComp from 1995
forward. All regressions include a dummyvariable whichtakes the value 1 in the Execucompsample years. R is common stock returns over the fiscal year. ColumnI
includes controls for Board Independence, Board Size, and their interactions with Rt and Rt-1, as well as controls for Firm Size, CEO Age, CEO Tenure, year fixed
effects and firm fixed effects. Financial expertise variables are dummies which take the value 1 when a director of the type in question is present. Board Size is the
natural logarithm of number of directors on the board. Board Independence is the ratio of outsiders to board size. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of assets at the
beginning of the year. Columns III and IV also include the interactions of Board Independence and Board Size with R t and Rt-1.
Table 10. Financial Experts and Executive Compensation